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ABSTRACT 
The involvement of the sensorimotor system in visual object processing is at the forefront 
of cognitive neuroscience research. Since the discovery of the mirror neuron system, a plethora of 
research has been dedicated to understanding how action influences cognition. Of particular 
interest to the current work is the way in which two-dimensional objects are represented in the 
human brain. Embodied cognition theories assert that the sensorimotor system plays a large (if 
not entire) role in the conceptual representation of objects. Interestingly, however, although 
somatosensation provides the first means of acquiring information from our environments and 
thus is integral to the development of conceptual representation, research has generally focused 
on motor system contributions to object processing. Therefore, this series of experiments will 
focus on unravelling the relationship between the somatosensory system and object processing. 
To do this, we employed two different priming paradigms, one in which vibratory stimulation 
served as a prime and an object picture as the target (Experiments 1 to 4), and the other where the 
object was the prime and the vibration the target (reverse priming task; Experiments 5 and 6). In 
Experiments 1 to 3, the participant was required to indicate how they would interact with the 
presented object (i.e., a semantic generation task). Results from Experiments 1 and 2 showed that 
object processing of graspable objects could be facilitated by a vibratory hand prime, compared 
to non-graspable objects (Experiment 1) and objects with foot related action affordances 
(Experiment 2), both of which showed no priming effects. Experiment 3 used a vibratory foot 
prime to investigate whether the priming effects in Experiments 1 and 2 were due semantic 
matching effects, such that drawing attention to a modality serves to enhance processing of 
objects related to that modality, and found no evidence to support this account. Experiment 4 
assessed the degree to which sensorimotor representations are automatically activated using an 
object-naming paradigm, which showed no somatosensory priming effects, and thus no evidence 
for automatic somatosensory involvement. Experiment 5 utilized the reverse priming task 
(described above), and found evidence for faster somatosensory detection when primed with a 
hand object, providing converging evidence of a reciprocal relationship between the 
somatosensory system and object processing. Finally, Experiment 6 examined whether the results 
from Experiment 5 were due to matching effects (similar to Experiment 3), and found no 
evidence for this account. Taken together, our research provides corroborative, converging 
evidence that semantic knowledge about how one interacts with manipulable objects involves 
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sensorimotor representations in the somatosensory system. This supports theories of embodied 
cognition and the mirror neuron system, and extends them from the motor domain to 
accommodate somatosensory influences, opening a new window into exploration of how touch 
may be incorporated into these theories. Implications for models of the mirror neuron system, and 
future directions for localizing these effects using neuroimaging are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
AN INTRODUCTION TO SENSORIMOTOR INVOLVEMENT IN CONCEPTUAL 
REPRESENTATION 
 
Experiments 1 and 2 of this chapter are based on one journal manuscript: 
Ekstrand, C., Lorentz, E., Gould, L., Mickleborough, M., & Borowsky, R. (2016). More than a 
feeling: Semantic knowledge of graspable objects is influenced by somatosensory priming. Under 
revision for Psychological Science.  
 
 The ability to process the objects in our environment is an essential component in 
understanding and interacting with the physical world around us. From birth, our first means of 
exploring the objects in our environment is through our sense of touch, and yet touch remains one 
of the most underresearched senses in cognitive research. Although both the motor and 
somatosensory systems are engaged during object manipulation, research has generally focused 
on the contributions of the motor system in shaping, and eventually becoming incorporated into, 
semantic (i.e., conceptual) representation. However, this focus on the motor system provides an 
incomplete picture of the nature of how conceptual information is represented in the brain and 
mind, as it does not take into account how touch may play an integral role in object 
understanding. Therefore, it is imperative that the contribution of the somatosensory system to 
conceptual knowledge is investigated, in order to broaden our understanding of the way in which 
objects are processed and represented in the mind. Based on this, the present research focuses on 
examining the intrinsic relationship between the conceptual representation of objects and the 
somatosensory system, in order to gain insight into how our sense of touch is involved in our 
knowledge about the objects in the world around us.  
 
The Mirror Neuron System and Conceptual Representation 
 The idea that the motor and sensory systems are involved in conceptual processing was 
previously elevated from the discovery of mirror neurons. Mirror neurons represent specific 
populations of neurons that activate both when an animal performs a specific object-directed 
action, as well as during observation of that action. They were originally discovered in the ventral 
premotor cortex of the macaque monkey by di Pelligrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, Rizzolatti 
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(1992), and were subsequently named mirror neurons in a later publication (Gallese, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, and Rizzolatti, 1996). In their seminal study, di Pelligrino et al. (1992) used single cell 
recording of neurons in area F5 of the premotor cortex of macaque monkeys while the animal 
either engaged in a specific action, or observed the experimenter engaging in the same action. 
Their results indicated that the same neurons were activated both during motor execution as well 
as during action observation. The researchers interpreted the bimodal (i.e., visual and motor) 
nature of these neurons as an indication that they are sensitive to the meaning of actions. 
Subsequently, evidence of a similar group of neurons has been shown in the parietal cortices, 
including parietal area PFG (Fogassi, Ferrari, Gesierich, Rozzi, Chersi, & Rizzolatti, 2005), as 
well as in the intraparietal area (Pani, Theys, Romero, & Janssen, 2014), suggesting that the 
mirror neuron system operates as a highly interconnected network in the primate brain.  
 Interestingly, mirror neurons have been shown to discharge not only upon the live 
execution of a motor act (i.e., when an actor is present and performing the action), but also during 
the observation of filmed actions. Caggiano et al. (2011) compared the magnitude of mirror 
neuron response in both a live setting as well as filmed setting. The monkeys observed goal-
directed actions carried out by the experimenter in the live setting (in this case, watching them 
pick up a raisin from a stick), whereas in the filmed setting, the animals watched another monkey 
reach for a pepper and eat it. The results indicated that the majority of mirror neurons were 
activated for both live and filmed action. This is an important finding, as it allows for greater 
experimental control in assessing the mirror neuron system, as well as providing evidence that 
stimuli need not be physically present in order to elicit this neuronal response. However, it was 
found that a large number of neurons that responded to both filmed and live action presentation 
were activated more strongly by the live action than the filmed action, showing differential 
neuronal responses to these differing types of stimuli, which should be taken into account when 
examining the mirror neuron system using any type of two dimensional stimuli (including 
pictures).  
 Mirror neurons have also been shown to be activated during the observation of motor acts 
performed by specific tools, suggesting that information coded by mirror neurons is related to the 
goal of the observed motor act, regardless of how this goal is achieved. Specifically, previous 
research has found that mirror neuron involvement can occur when the tool of interest is known 
to the monkey (Ferrari, Rozzi, & Fogassi, 2005; Umiltà et al., 2008; Rochat et al., 2010; Peeters 
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et al., 2009; Iriki, 2006). Ferrari et al. (2005) had monkeys engage in an extended training 
paradigm (i.e., two months), whereby the animals observed the experimenter repeatedly perform 
an action with a tool. Tools in this experiment included both a stick (which was used to pick up 
food as well as to feed the monkey), and a pair of pliers (which were used to grasp the food in 
addition to feeding it to the monkey), however the monkeys did not interact with the tools 
directly. Single neuron recording was then performed after this exposure training. The results 
indicated that there was a population of neurons that responded to viewing actions carried out by 
the tools, but this response did not extend to tools not viewed in training. As well, they showed 
that neuronal responses were highest when the tool produced actions and effects that were 
congruent with actions in the monkey’s own motor repertoire (e.g., using pliers to pick up an 
object is similar to picking up the object with the hands). Interestingly, however, when the 
monkeys were subsequently placed in an environment where use of the tool was necessary in 
order for them to reach a food reward, they did not engage in tool use. These results suggest that 
while the monkey was able to identify that the tool could achieve a certain goal, they were unable 
to use this information in order to perform the same action. 
Canonical Neurons and Canonical Mirror Neurons 
The literature reviewed thus far suggests that actions can be integrated into the body 
schema of monkeys, however it provides little insight into the nature of object representation. 
The affordances of objects (i.e., the sites where a goal directed action can be achieved with an 
object) are directly related to goal-directed actions (Gibson, 1979), and thus, should also have 
representations in the mirror neuron system. Evidence of another class of visuomotor neurons, 
known as canonical neurons, has also been found, supporting this conclusion (Murata et al., 
1997; Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001). Canonical neurons are bimodal neurons that have both motor 
and visual properties and are found in the lower portion of area F5. They differ from mirror 
neurons in that rather than firing in response to observed actions, they respond selectively to the 
presentation of a three-dimensional object within peripersonal (i.e., reaching) space, in addition 
to firing during action execution. These neurons have been shown to be relatively object specific, 
such that neurons that code for whole-hand grasping actions also fire in response to the 
observation of a large object but not a small object, whereas neurons that code for precise 
prehension fire during observation of a small object but not a large object. Further, they also 
respond to presentation of objects with similar affordances, based on the types of interactions the 
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object permits. This suggests that canonical neurons code for the types of actions for which a 
particular class of objects allow, thus supporting the conclusion that motor information is 
intrinsically bound to the representation of an object when it can be interacted with. Further, an 
additional class of neurons has been found, termed canonical-mirror neurons, which have 
properties of both canonical and mirror neurons.  Canonical-mirror neurons have been shown to 
respond during action execution, object presentation in peripersonal space and, unlike canonical 
neurons, to observation of an action upon an object (Bonini, Maranesi, Livi, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 
2014). As such, these neurons code not only the grasping of an object (regardless of the agent), 
but also the graspability of a presented object. Thus, canonical neurons and canonical mirror 
neurons may provide a mechanism by which object shape and function are coupled in the 
monkey brain, allowing for comprehension and interaction with objects in their visual world. 
However, as stated previously, both canonical and canonical-mirror neurons are only 
active when the object is within peripersonal space, and thus activation of these neurons does not 
indicate that the conceptual representation of an object is reliant upon sensorimotor involvement. 
As well, while these results provide evidence that objects that are behaviourly relevant to the 
primate recruit the mirror neuron system, there is currently little to no evidence for mirror system 
involvement in representing objects that are presented in extrapersonal space. This does not, 
however, rule out the possibility of mirror system involvement in conceptual representation in 
humans, as humans have an advanced ability to understand the relationships between objects and 
the actions for which they afford, which is not necessarily the case for primates (Povinelli, Reaux, 
Theall, & Giambrone, 2000). Thus, the mirror neuron system in humans has been shown to be 
much more complex than in primates.  
The Human Mirror Neuron System 
While the mirror neuron system has been well delineated in primates, the mirror neuron 
system in humans has been less clear-cut. Homologues of the mirror neuron regions of monkeys 
have been found, suggesting the existence of an equivalent mirror system (see Figure 1). 
Generally well accepted is the presence of human homologue areas in the parietal cortex, 
including the anterior intraparietal (AIP) area, which is involved in integrating visual and motor 
information (Durand, Peeters, Norman, Todd, Orban, 2009), as well as the homolog for the PFG, 
thought to be located in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL; Orban & Caruana, 2014). Early evidence 
had previously implicated Brodmann area 44 in the human inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) as a 
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possible homologue of area F5 in the monkey cortex (Preuss, 1995; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998, 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), and some neuroimaging studies have supported this conclusion 
(Cattaneo, Sandrini, & Schwarzbach, 2010; see also Avenanti, Candidi, and Urgesi, 2013 for a 
review). However, it has recently been suggested that task differences in these earlier studies may 
have led to activation in this area that is not related to the mirror neuron system and, indeed, 
when a recent meta-analysis was constrained to examine only studies using hand actions and 
passive observers, this area was not active, and instead it appears that Brodmann area 6 of the 
precentral gyrus is more likely to be the homologue of F5 (ventral premotor cortex; vPM; 
Grosbras, Beaton, & Eickhoff, 2012; see also Cerri et al., 2014). Temporal mirror neuron areas 
have also been identified (including the superior temporal sulcus, STS), however we will focus 
primarily on the parietal and frontal mirror neuron system areas. Thus, while the primate mirror 
neuron system is generally well understood, obtaining direct evidence for the areas involved in 
the human mirror neuron system using neuroimaging and physiological methods is still necessary.  
 
Figure 1. Key areas of the human mirror system. From anterior to posterior: IFG = inferior 
frontal gyrus, vPM = ventral premotor cortex, dPM = dorsal premotor cortex, MC = primary 
motor cortex, hMC = hand primary motor cortex, SI = primary somatosensory cortex, hSI = hand 
primary somatosensory cortex, AIP = anterior intraparietal sulcus, IPL = inferior parietal lobule, 
SPL = superior parietal lobule, SMG = supramarginal gyrus, IPS = intraparietal sulcus, STS = 
superior temporal sulcus. Adapted from Cattaneo and Rizzolatti (2009). 
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Indirect evidence for a mirror neuron system has been shown using various imaging 
techniques. For example, Cross, Torrisi, Losin, and Iacoboni (2013) used an imitation control 
paradigm during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), whereby participants viewed a 
video cue of a hand either lifting its index or middle finger (the imitative condition) or a video 
cue where a moving dot was presented on either the index or middle finger. Participants were 
required to make a motor response that was either congruent with the video cue (e.g., lifting the 
index finger when the cue index finger was lifted, or when the moving dots were presented on 
that finger) or incongruent. Their results indicated that there was a system of brain regions 
involved in identifying and resolving the imitative conflict (including the prefrontal cortex and 
the IFG) when the participant was required to make an incongruent action in the imitative 
condition. The researchers took this as evidence that the IFG and prefrontal cortex are integral 
components of the human mirror neuron system.  
Further, evidence from Sartori, Begliomini, and Castiello (2013) used transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) to invoke reversible lesions in the primary motor cortex (MC). Left- 
and right-handed participants observed a model performing object-directed grasping actions with 
either their left or right hand while the experimenters monitored the participant’s motor-evoked 
potentials (MEPs) induced by the TMS pulse. MEP amplitude acts as a measure of motor tract 
excitability (in this case, the corticospinal tract) associated with a specific action. Results 
indicated that there was a change in the MEP in the dominant hemisphere in response to the 
observed action regardless of whether the dominant or non-dominant effector performed the 
action. This suggests that motor representations are effector-independent, providing evidence of 
abstract encoding of movement in a higher order system that translates motor information into a 
format that matches the participant’s hand preference. Thus, this research provides evidence of a 
mirror system in humans that encodes actions in terms of an individual’s motor repertoire.  
Of particular interest to the current studies, somatosensory activation has also been shown 
during the processing of action related stimuli. Tactile sensory information is processed initially 
in the primary somatosensory cortex (SI) before undergoing further processing in the SPL, AIP, 
and IPL, whereby these areas then have bidirectional projections to the dPM and vPM cortices 
(Hari & Forss, 1999; Petrides & Pandya, 2002). As the somatosensory cortices have been shown 
to have this extensive connectivity with the motor system, Avikainen, Forss, and Hari (2002) 
hypothesized the action observation should impact somatosensory activation. Somatosensory 
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evoked fields (a measure of somatosensory system involvement, which were produced in this 
experiment using median nerve stimulation) were recorded during a rest condition (where no task 
was performed), a manipulation condition (whereby the participant manipulated a small object in 
their hand), and an observation condition (whereby the participant observed another person 
manipulating the object). Results indicated that in the action observation condition, activation in 
SI was enhanced. Further, Woods, Hernandez, Wagner, and Beilock (2014) extended these 
findings beyond the visual domain, showing that when experts listened to familiar sports sounds 
(e.g., a basketball dribble), there was extensive activation in motor planning regions of the brain, 
as well as SI. Finally, somatosensory stimulation has been shown to enhance motor plasticity as a 
function of action observation. Bisio et al. (2015) had participants observe finger-tapping 
movements in conjunction with somatosensory stimulation to the median nerve of the arm. Their 
results indicated that there was greater corticomotor excitability in MC when visual and 
somatosensory information were combined, suggesting that the somatosensory system plays an 
important role in processing action information. Overall, these studies help to gain valuable 
insight into the mirror neuron system in humans, however based on the indirect nature of the 
tasks it is difficult to definitively identify the specific neural regions that encompass this system.  
The Sensorimotor System and Three Dimensional Objects 
In the absence of a complete understanding of the mirror neuron system in humans, an 
interesting question arises as to how objects (including tools) are represented in the human brain. 
As discussed earlier, while primates do engage in some tool use, it is to a much lesser extent than 
humans. Further, humans have an advanced ability to understand the causal relationship between 
tool use and the obtained results, however this is not the case for primates (Povinelli et al., 2000). 
Thus, the use of primate models in assessing the degree of sensorimotor and mirror system 
involvement in object representation in humans may not be entirely feasible, as it appears that 
they do not share equivalent representations among species. Indeed, even between primate 
species (e.g., between macaque monkeys and chimpanzees), the mirror neuron system has been 
shown to be quite variable and appears to have substantially evolved over time (whereby the 
mirror neuron system in chimpanzees is more complex than that of macaques; e.g., Hecht et al., 
2013; Rozzi et al., 2006; see also Hecht & Parr, 2015 for a review). Coupled with our limited 
knowledge of the human mirror neuron system, exploration of the systems involved in object 
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representation (with an emphasis on tool use) has largely used indirect measures, which will be 
discussed below.  
Patient research has provided compelling evidence for the integration of objects into an 
individual’s body schema. For example, Aglioti, Smania, Manfredi, and Berlucchi (1996) 
reported on a patient with damage to her right hemisphere who was unable to perceive her left 
hand as her own. This disownership was also found to extend to objects associated with her left 
hand (such as a wedding ring) suggesting that the semantic representation of these objects had 
been incorporated into sensorimotor areas associated with that hand. In line with this, Pegna et al. 
(2001) reported on a patient with left spatial neglect in peripersonal space that was also apparent 
when engaging in tool use that extended this space. When performing a typical line bisection task 
(whereby individuals are asked to bisect a line in what they perceive to be the center of it, see 
Bowers & Heilman, 1980), the patient showed the characteristic rightward bias found in most 
neglect patients. Further, when asked to bisect a line beyond their reach with a tool (in this case a 
long stick), this rightward bias was also apparent. Interestingly, however, the patient showed no 
deficits in line bisection when asked to bisect the distant line using a laser pointer, suggesting that 
tools that extend peripersonal space may become integrated into the sensorimotor system. As 
such, patient data has provided further evidence that objects have the ability to become 
incorporated into our neural representations based on our action experience with them. 
Skill Learning  
Expertise has also been linked to the mirror neuron system and sensorimotor activity. 
Specifically, gaining expertise in motor acts through practice has been shown to result in changes 
in plasticity at the level of not only the brain, but also the spinal and peripheral levels. For 
example, Pearce, Thickbroom, Byrnes, & Mastaglia (2000) used TMS to examine possible 
functional reorganization of corticomotor projections of elite racquet players. Their results 
indicated that, in comparison to non-elite players, elite players showed enhanced corticomotor 
excitability in MC, in conjunction with larger asymmetries in the topographic motor map of the 
hand, between the dominant (playing) hand and the non-dominant hand. Further, Vogt et al. 
(2007) used event-related fMRI to examine changes in neural activity associated with developing 
motor expertise. Their results showed that novel skill learning (via observation) leads to 
heightened involvement of areas implicated in the mirror neuron system in comparison to 
observation of previously learned actions. Further, the prefrontal cortex was shown to be 
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selectively recruited during observation and response preparation for non-practiced actions, as 
opposed to the practiced actions (see also Buccino et al., 2004). Thus, the mirror neuron system 
appears to be engaged more strongly during motor acquisition, whereas the sensorimotor system 
appears to be more related to skilled actions.  
Further, this effect of expertise also extends to action observation. Simple observation of 
a motor act in the absence of motor execution has been shown to lead to reorganization of the 
motor system, although to a much lesser extent than actually performing the action. In a TMS 
study, Stefan et al. (2005) had participants view the same action repeatedly (e.g., watching 
repetitive thumb movements) over a period of 30 minutes. Prior to observation, thumb 
movements were repeatedly elicited via a TMS pulse to MC, in order to establish a baseline 
direction of movement. Following the action observation training period, their results indicated 
that the TMS pulse elicited thumb movements that deviated in the direction of the observed 
thumb movements. This suggests that there was functional reorganization of the cortical regions 
associated with the muscles performing the action, even though the participants themselves did 
not actually perform the action. In addition, in a magnetoencephalography (MEG) study 
performed by Järvelänen, Shürman, and Hari (2004), when participants viewed the experimenter 
using chopsticks to transfer small objects from one plate to another, there was larger mu rhythm 
rebound (the recovery of a frequency band associated with sensorimotor involvement, which is 
indicative of the extent of motor cortex activation elicited) than if the experimenter performed a 
similar action without actually engaging with the object. However, mu rhythm rebound was still 
present during the non-goal directed action, showing that actual interaction with an object is not 
necessary for sensorimotor involvement. Importantly, this change in activation was positively 
correlated with the frequency of the participants’ chopstick use, suggesting that involvement of 
sensorimotor areas varies as a function of personal motor experience.  
Extending upon these findings, Fourkas, Bonavolontà, Avenanti, and Aglioti (2008) 
examined how tools may become integrated into an individual’s body representation and whether 
or not these representations could be evoked by engaging in motor imagery (i.e., visualizing 
oneself performing an action). The researchers measured corticospinal excitability of the muscles 
in the forearm and hand of expert and non-expert tennis players while asking them to visualize 
themselves performing a tennis swing, a table tennis swing, or a golf drive. Results indicated that 
expert tennis players showed increased corticospinal activity during tennis motor imagery, but 
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not in the other conditions, whereas novice players showed no differences throughout the three 
motor imagery tasks. Thus, drawing upon semantic motor imagery also has the ability to engage 
sensorimotor processes, resulting in sensorimotor modulation at the peripheral level. Further, 
using fMRI, Grèzes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham (2003) found evidence for canonical neurons, 
which responded both to object presentation as well as action execution towards the object, in the 
human intraparietal area and precentral sulcus, providing additional evidence that objects can be 
represented in the mirror neuron system. 
The evidence reviewed thus far in humans has highlighted the interconnectivity of 
perception and action by focusing primarily on observed motor acts towards an object, but a 
critical question arises as to whether static object presentation evokes sensorimotor involvement. 
That is, are the conceptual representations of objects inherently bound to the sensorimotor system 
in humans? This has been a hotly debated topic in cognitive neuroscience over the past three 
decades. Almost in parallel with the discoveries related to the mirror neuron system, the extent to 
which there is involvement of the motor and sensory systems in conceptual representation 
became a prominent topic in the field of psychology. In regards to the mirror neuron system, the 
presence of canonical and canonical mirror neurons in monkeys (i.e., neurons that respond to 
mere presentation of an object) may provide a potential mechanism for a perception-action 
representation of objects in humans, thus rendering it plausible that the conceptual representation 
of at least some object-action pairs are represented in the sensorimotor system. This is supported 
by research by Goodale, Milner, and colleagues, who have performed extensive research on the 
relationship between perception and action and how it relates to the dorsal (‘where/how’) and 
ventral (‘what’) processing streams (see Milner & Goodale, 2006, for a review). Of particular 
interest, areas in the parietal lobe (most notably the IPL) have been implicated to be involved in 
integrating perceptual and action information, and thus as the locus of semantic action knowledge 
pertaining to objects. Theories that assert that the sensorimotor system plays a large part in 
conceptual representation are referred to as modal or embodied theories of cognition, whereas 
theories that assert that concepts are not inherently linked to the sensorimotor system are referred 
to as amodal or disembodied. This debate has led to a plethora of interesting research 
investigating the way that objects (such as tools) are represented in the human brain, which will 
be reviewed in the upcoming section.  
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Embodied Cognition and Conceptual Object Representation 
Amodal theories of cognition posit that conceptual representations are inherently distinct 
from the sensorimotor system of the brain. Therefore, concepts are seen as symbolic and abstract, 
requiring transformation from their sensorimotor origins (see Lachman, Lachman, & Butterfield, 
1979). In contrast, modality-specific/embodied theories posit that the perceptual and motor 
representations that the concept arose from are intrinsically bound to the cognitive representation 
of that concept, both functionally and neuroanatomically (Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 
2003; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2001; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; Martin & Chao, 2001; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999). Embodied cognition theories generally converge upon two main points. First, 
they assert that semantic knowledge is carried by sensorimotor representations, such that the 
neural systems involved in forming semantic knowledge are also the systems retrieving it and 
thus that conceptual knowledge is based in our perceptual and motor systems (e.g., Barsalou, 
2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). Second, they assert that semantic representations are essentially 
simulations of the perceptual and motor information used to encode these representations, thus 
recruiting modality specific sensorimotor systems.  
Of particular interest to the controversy of what degree of conceptual representation 
resides in the sensorimotor system is the issue of how tools are represented in the human brain, 
which are perhaps the most well studied object stimuli in the embodied cognition literature. Tools 
represent an interesting class of objects as they allow for goal-directed actions to occur by 
extending our body space, in order to interact with and manipulate the environment. Previous 
research has indicated that tool use has the ability to alter conceptual representations at the neural 
level. In a review by Maravita and Iriki (2004), it was concluded that tools become integrated 
into the body schema in such a way that leads to plastic modification of the body representation 
in the brain, such that the tool acts as an extension of the body. Presentation of tools has been 
shown to activate parietal motor areas (particularly the anterior supramarginal gyrus; SMG), thus 
providing evidence that action properties are intrinsically bound to this type of stimuli (Chao & 
Martin, 2000). Further, research by Culham, Valyear, and Stiglick (2004) found that when 
participants silently named two-dimensional images of tools, there was activation in the AIP, an 
area implicated in the human mirror neuron system (as discussed previously). Importantly, this 
activation overlapped with activation found when the participant engaged in visually-guided 
action, suggesting that even in the absence of an overt task, tools recruit neural areas that are 
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critical to visually-guided grasping (see also Lewis, 2007 for a review). This research also 
suggested that the three-dimensional object need not be physically present to engage parietal 
motor areas, which is critical for theories of embodiment. The anterior SMG has also been 
implicated in tool processing, which is in close proximity to the AIP. Further, these two 
structures are thought to be highly interconnected via the dorsal IPS (Orban & Caruana, 2014), 
suggesting that a network of posterior parietal areas may be involved in tool processing. Thus, 
this research supports the conclusion that tools can become integrated into the sensorimotor 
system. 
Behavioural evidence has also supported the idea of sensorimotor simulation in response 
to a presented object, therefore supporting theories of embodiment. Early research by Craighero, 
Fadiga, Umiltà, and Rizzolatti (1996) found evidence of a visuomotor priming effect following 
presentation of an object. Prior to performing a motor task (in this case, grasping a bar) 
participants were presented with a rectangle that was oriented at either 45 degrees clockwise or 
45 degrees counterclockwise. The bar was either at the same orientation as the rectangle prime 
(i.e., congruent trials) or at a different orientation (i.e., incongruent trials). The participants were 
then required to reach out and grasp the target bar, which was occluded from their view, and a 
verbal cue prior to each trial indicated what orientation the target bar would occur in. The results 
indicated that participants were significantly faster at grasping the bar if it was at a congruent 
orientation to the prime. The researchers took this result to indicate that motor actions can be 
primed by visual stimuli, thus supporting the idea that passive viewing of an object can evoke 
action representations. In addition, seminal work in embodied cognition by Tucker and Ellis 
(1998) showed similar results when the prime was a real-world object, rather than a simple 
geometric shape. Participants were primed with a picture of an object with a unilateral affordance 
(e.g., a frying pan, whereby the object’s affordance is for grasping the handle). Following this, 
they were asked to perform a categorization judgment of whether the object was upright or 
inverted using either a left or right keypress (counterbalanced between participants), thus 
rendering the position of the affordance irrelevant to the behavioural task. Their results indicated 
that participants were faster at making a motor response with the hand to which the affordance 
was oriented towards, suggesting that presentation of the object primed the motor system related 
to the relevant hand. Similarly to Craighero et al. (1996) they concluded that the object 
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automatically evoked sensorimotor representations that then facilitated the participant’s motor 
response.  
Further, Helbig, Graf, and Kiefer (2006) extended this finding to show that performing 
action is not required in order to facilitate object processing and that objects with specific 
affordances can facilitate processing of objects with similar affordances. Participants were 
primed with a picture of an object that either had a similar affordance to a target object, for 
example if the target was a frying pan, a dust pan prime would have a congruent action 
affordance for grasping, or a dissimilar action affordance, for example a banjo. Participants had 
significantly higher naming accuracy of the target objects when the prime had a congruent action 
affordance, thereby suggesting that objects automatically evoke motor representations during 
processing. In addition, Witt, Kemmerer, Linkenauger, and Culham (2010) found evidence for a 
functional role of motor simulation in the processing of manipulable objects. When participants 
performed a motor task (squeezing a ball) while identifying tools, it was found that the motor 
task interfered with processing when the object’s affordance was on the same side. Finally, 
interference effects also vary as a function of an individual’s sensory experience with an object. 
Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, and Thompson-Schill (2013) found that the more sensory experience a 
participant had with an object, the larger the observed motor interference effect, which highlights 
the integral role of the sensorimotor system in object representation. Thus, the above research 
supports the conclusion that action affordances of manipulable objects are intrinsically bound to 
their conceptual representation, therefore supporting embodied theories of object representation. 
However, these results were contested in subsequent years, thus making it difficult to 
come to a clear conclusion about the involvement of the sensorimotor system in conceptual 
representation. Cant, Westwood, Valyear, and Goodale (2005) argued that Craighero et al.’s 
(1996) results arose primarily as a function of the prime facilitating memory-guided grasping, as 
opposed to visually-guided grasping, as the authors argued. As such, the prime may have served 
to simply facilitate the memory of a specific orientation of grasping action, rather than the 
grasping action itself. In their series of experiments, Cant et al. (2005) replicated the findings of 
Craighero et al. (1996) in the memory-guided grasping condition only. When participants were 
not told about the upcoming orientation of the target object (i.e., were unable to rely on previous 
memory of an action), no priming effects were found for grasping as a function of the visual 
prime. In addition, the findings of Tucker and Ellis (1998) have failed to be replicated in at least 
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two separate studies (Bub & Masson, 2010; Yu, Abrams, & Zacks, 2014) and further evidence 
from Cho & Proctor (2011) has shown that alignment effects associated with the site of the object 
affordance can be produced by asymmetries in the visual display rather than by motor 
affordances themselves. Their results indicated that the salient feature of an object biased 
responses with the corresponding hand, regardless of its affordance (e.g., when a teapot was 
presented without a handle, the location of the spout elicited similar biases to the handle as those 
shown in the Tucker & Ellis, 1998 study, even though the spout does not have the same action 
affordance). Thus, it has remained contentious as to whether the passive viewing of objects 
automatically triggers inherent sensorimotor system involvement that is functionally involved in 
semantic processing. 
In light of this, however, and similar to the research discussed above in regards to 
expertise in motor imagery, compelling evidence from Kiefer, Sim, Liebich, Hauk, and Tanaka 
(2007) has shown that sensorimotor involvement in conceptual processing is dependent upon 
action experience with an object. Participants were required to categorize objects based on their 
motor affordances and, depending on the group, either pantomime interacting with, or point at, 
the object during a training period of 16 sessions lasting one hour each. Results at test indicated 
that objects in the pantomime group showed sensorimotor involvement during object processing, 
suggesting that motor information contributes to semantic processing depending on specific 
learning experience. Hence, it appears that the semantic representation of objects in the 
sensorimotor system is reliant on past individual experience. Further, Weisberg, van Turennout, 
and Martin (2007) trained participants to use novel objects in a goal-directed, tool-like manner, in 
order to examine the neural activity associated with training. Prior to motor training, participants 
viewed pictures of the objects during fMRI, whereby activation was limited to areas involved in 
object processing. Following training, an extensive network of activation was found in not only 
object processing areas, but also action areas (including the premotor cortex). Thus, it is possible 
that the lack of visuomotor priming effects in the experiments by Cant et al. (2005), Bub and 
Masson (2010), and Yu et al. (2014) may be in part due to participants lacking a certain amount 
of motor experience with the presented objects, as well as task demands that were not optimal for 
observing an effect.  
 While it remains contentious as to whether passive viewing of an object inherently 
necessitates sensorimotor involvement, passive viewing is not the only way to tap into the 
 15 
semantic knowledge about an object. Retrieving semantic information about sensory- and motor-
based properties of objects can also be used to investigate sensorimotor involvement in object 
representation. For example, Simmons, Ramjee, McRae, Martin, and Barsalou (2006) had 
participants retrieve information about an object’s colour and found that, in comparison to 
retrieving information about the object’s motion, there was heightened activity in colour 
perception areas of the brain (including V4). Further, in regards to word stimuli, Hauk, Johnsrude, 
and Pulvermuller (2004) found that when participants simply read words denoting actions 
associated with certain modalities (e.g., the word ‘lick’ is related to the tongue), there was 
activation in the premotor cortices associated with that modality. In addition, evidence from 
Schendan and Ganis (2012) has shown that engaging in motor imagery prior to presentation of an 
object has the ability to enhance object processing, suggesting that mental simulation mimics 
perception and can lead to a sustained imagistic representation that is similar to actual perceptual 
mechanisms. Of particular relevance to the current studies, another way of evoking semantic 
representation is by asking participants to retrieve information about the functional properties of 
objects, thus drawing upon their personal semantic knowledge of interacting with that object. 
Esopenko et al. (2012) had participants engage in a semantic generation task, during which they 
were required to indicate how they would interact with a presented object (in picture format) as 
quickly and accurately as possible during fMRI (see also Boronat et al., 2004 for a similar 
manipulation identification task). The stimuli in this experiment consisted of objects with 
primarily hand (e.g., a pen) or foot related affordances (e.g., a soccer ball). Their results indicated 
that there was somatotopically-organized activation in the sensorimotor and premotor cortices 
associated with the primary modality of interaction with the object, that were in close proximity 
to the activation found using motor localizer tasks for these modalities. As such, having the 
participant rely on their own semantic action knowledge of an object provides optimal task 
demands for investigating sensorimotor involvement in object representation.  
It is interesting to note, however, that although touch (i.e., somatosensation) is the first 
sense to develop (see Gallace & Spence, 2010) and therefore provides the first means of 
acquiring of essential information from our environments, it has been relatively overshadowed by 
research focused on the motor, as well as other cognitive, systems. Thus, it remains one of the 
most underresearched senses in behavioural research. In light of this, a few studies have sought to 
investigate how somatosensory information may play a role in some types of conceptual 
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processing. For example, early research from Klatzky, Lederman, and Metzger (1985) 
contradicted the prevalent assumption at the time that the haptic system is a poor recognition 
device by showing that, unlike when individuals are trained to haptically identify nonsense 
shapes, participants showed rapid and accurate object recognition when they explored familiar, 
real-world objects. Further, Connell and Lynott (2010) had participants classify briefly presented 
words based on their sensory properties (auditory, gustatory, tactile, olfactory, visual, 
visuotactile; e.g., the word ‘itchy’ has tactile sensory properties). Their results indicated that 
participants showed a selective disadvantage in the conceptual processing of somatosensory 
stimuli, such that participants were considerably slower at classifying the tactile words into the 
tactile sensory category. The researchers interpreted these results as support for embodied 
theories of cognition, such that the conceptual system recruits the perceptual system (including 
the somatosensory system) for the purposes of representation, as these results are in direct 
concordance with the tactile disadvantage shown in perception tasks of a similar nature (Spence, 
Nicholls, & Driver, 2001; Turatto, Galfano, Bridgeman, & Umiltà, 2004). In addition, Ackerman, 
Nocera, and Bargh (2010) found evidence of somatosensory involvement in influencing social 
judgments and decision-making. In a series of experiments, participants were provided with an 
object with irrelevant tactile properties to the task (e.g., in one experiment, either a heavy or a 
light clipboard) and were asked to give impressions of, and make decisions about, both people 
and situations. Overall, their results showed that the tactile information was able to influence 
impressions and judgments in a systematic, metaphor-specific way (e.g., in one experiment, when 
the participants were holding a heavier clipboard, as opposed to a lighter one, they perceived 
potential job candidates as more important). Finally, James et al. (2002) found that objects 
previously explored haptically were responded to faster when that object was presented visually 
at test. As well, participants showed enhanced object processing when haptically exploring a 
novel object simultaneously with visual processing. Based on this, is becomes clear that the 
somatosensory system appears to play an essential role in conceptual processing, however its 
contribution in the domain of visual object processing and object representation has remained 
comparatively unexplored.  
Therefore, this series of experiments will focus on unravelling the relationship between 
the somatosensory system and its involvement in object representation. Experiments 1 and 2 will 
examine whether the processing of manipulable objects can be enhanced using a somatosensory 
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prime, in comparison to non-manipulable objects (Experiment 1) and objects with foot related 
action affordances (Experiment 2). Following this, Experiment 3 will seek to provide evidence 
that this effect is not due to semantic matching, such that simply drawing attention to a specific 
body part serves to enhance processing of objects related to that modality, rather than a direct 
influence of the somatosensory system. Experiment 4 will examine the extent to which the 
somatosensory system is automatically involved in object processing using a naming paradigm, 
as it is contentious as to whether picture stimuli automatically evoke strong sensorimotor 
involvement. Following this, Experiment 5 will seek to provide converging evidence of a 
reciprocal relationship between the somatosensory system and object processing by reversing the 
paradigm and making the object the prime and the vibratory stimulus the target, in order to 
examine whether the picture prime has the ability to influence somatosensory detection. Finally, 
Experiment 6 will be analogous to Experiment 3, to test if the results from Experiment 5 may be 
due to semantic matching effects, as opposed to a direct influence of the somatosensory system.  
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CHAPTER 2 
SOMATOSENSORY INFLUENCES ON THE PROCESSING OF MANIPULABLE OBJECTS 
Experiment 1 
This experiment focuses on examining the impact of somatosensory stimulation on object 
processing based on whether the object can be easily interacted with (i.e., graspable objects) or is 
difficult to interact with (i.e., non-graspable objects) using the semantic generation task 
developed by Esopenko et al. (2012). This task will optimize our ability to examine embodiment 
effects by maximizing the amount of personally-relevant sensorimotor activation elicited, thus 
remediating some of the limitations of previous experiments that used naming reaction times 
(RTs) as their dependent variable (e.g., Helbig et al., 2006). Further, by having participants draw 
upon their own action knowledge, we are increasing the likelihood that they will engage in motor 
simulation, thus maximizing the probability that the mirror system will be engaged in this task. 
Importantly, this paradigm allows for examination of purely somatosensory influences on object 
processing, without confounding somatosensory involvement with motor involvement, by using a 
passive somatosensory prime. Because the participant is not required to engage in any overt hand 
movements (as was the case in James et al.’s, 2002 study, whereby the participant actively 
manipulated the object to gain haptic information about it) we are able to assess the extent to 
which the somatosensory system is tied to semantic knowledge independently of the motor 
system, which, as of yet, has not been explored.    
Hypotheses 
We hypothesize that the action affordances of the graspable objects should necessitate 
semantic processing in the sensorimotor system (in concordance with embodied theories of object 
representation) and, thus, that somatosensory priming should lead to faster responses to these 
objects. In contrast, as the non-graspable objects do not have inherent action affordances, 
somatosensory priming should not lead to faster responses to these objects.  
Methods 
Participants. Twenty-eight university students who spoke English as their first language 
(Mage = 21.2, 24 right-handed) participated in this study. All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. This study received ethical approval from the University of Saskatchewan 
Behavioral Research Ethics Board.  
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Stimuli. Objects consisted of coloured pictures of 30 ‘graspable’ objects (e.g., a frying pan, 
a razor; see Appendix A) and 30 ‘non-graspable’ objects (e.g., an elephant, a tractor; see 
Appendix B) presented randomly on a white background acquired from Google Images. A small 
subset of the graspable and non-graspable items were adapted from an fMRI study by Wilf, 
Holmes, Schwartz, and Making (2013) that were matched on visual complexity, which we used 
when piloting an fMRI variant of our task, resulting in four of the same objects being presented 
twice (i.e., two different cups, two different frying pans, two different staplers, and two different 
spoons). 
Procedure and Apparatus. Participants were asked to identify how they would interact with 
a picture of a presented coloured object as quickly and accurately as possible (similar to Martin, 
Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995; see also Boronat et al., 2004 for a similar 
manipulation identification task). This task was chosen in order to maximize personally relevant 
sensorimotor activation (e.g., Borowsky et al., 2005; Borowsky, Esopenko, Cummine, & Sarty, 
2007; Esopenko et al., 2012), which would serve to optimize the potential impact of the 
somatosensory prime. The experiment was completed on a standard Mac computer operating as a 
PC with Windows OS and E-Prime 2.0 software was used to program and run the experiment 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., http://www.pstnet.com). Participants were seated 
approximately 100 cm from a 15-inch Compaq 7500 CRT monitor, on which the object pictures 
were presented. Directly in front of the participant was a 12-inch Alpine SWR-T12 Type-R 
subwoofer on which they placed their dominant hand, which served to provide the somatosensory 
prime. The subwoofer was interfaced to the E-Prime program on the computer via a Memphis 
PRX4.50 4-Channel amplifier. 
 The trial progression was as follows: participants were required to fixate on a central 
fixation cross until the researcher initiated each trial (see Figure 2 for a general trial progression 
for Experiments 1 to 4). After trial initiation, on half of the trials, a 250 ms subsonic 20 Hz tone 
was played through the subwoofer that served to provide the vibratory prime to the participant’s 
dominant hand. This frequency was chosen in order to render the prime inaudible to the 
participant, as well as to maximize somatosensory activation at the level of the cortex by 
primarily activating Meissner corpuscles (sensitive to frequencies in the 2-40 Hz range), which 
have projections through the dorsal column/medial lemniscus pathway to the thalamus and 
subsequently to the primary somatosensory cortex (see McGlone & Reilly, 2010 for a review). 
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On the other half of the trials there was no vibration (i.e., a 250 ms gap). Coincident with this 250 
ms interval (i.e., the vibration or the gap), a 6000 Hz tone was played through a different set of 
speakers than the subwoofers. As the experiment was being recorded for later playback, this tone 
was used to indicate trial onset for use during data examination, as well as to control for possible 
alerting effects of the somatosensory prime in comparison to the no prime condition (as alerting 
signals have been shown to reliably reduce reaction time; see Callejas, Lupiàñez, Jesús Funes, & 
Tudela, 2005). Immediately following the prime or gap, an object picture was presented in the 
center of the screen. Each object appeared in both the prime and no prime conditions and the 
order of trials was randomly selected. Each primed and non-primed object pair was presented 
twice, thus resulting in 120 experimental trials.  
 
Figure 2. General trial progression for Experiments 1 to 4. 
 
Participants were required to visualize themselves interacting with the presented object 
and report how they would interact with it, as quickly and accurately as possible, in order to 
optimally engage semantic systems involved in action representation. A LabTec AM-22 
microphone interfaced with the E-Prime serial response box was triggered upon the participant’s 
vocal response in order to obtain their RT for each trial. The researcher then coded ‘1’ for a 
correct response, ‘2’ for an incorrect response (i.e., if the response did not accurately describe the 
functionality of the presented object), and ‘3’ for a spoil (if the microphone was triggered 
prematurely or failed to be triggered upon initial response). Any reasonable response to an object 
was accepted based on the personally relevant nature of the task. For example, if ‘razor’ was the 
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target ‘shave with’ or ‘pick-up’ would both be considered acceptable responses. There was no 
time limit on how long the participant had to respond and the object disappeared from the screen 
when the microphone voice key was triggered. Following the experimental trials, participants 
were required to give interaction familiarity ratings for each of the objects. The objects were 
randomly presented on the screen and the participant vocally indicated how familiar they 
personally were with interacting with the object on a scale of one to seven, whereby one was 
‘Very Familiar’ (i.e., on a daily or near-daily basis) and seven was ‘Very Unfamiliar’ (i.e., never 
interacted with). The researcher then coded their response. Once again, there was no time limit on 
how long the participant had to respond. 
Results 
All errors and spoils were removed prior to analysis (8.5% of the total trials). We 
conducted a 2 (Object [Graspable, Non-graspable]) x 2 (Prime [Hand Prime, No Prime]) general 
linear model ANOVA on median RTs. We found a main effect of Object, F(1, 27) = 68.00, MSE 
= 8163.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .72, such that graspable objects were responded to significantly faster 
than non-graspable objects (M = 911.87 and M = 1052.70, respectively), reflecting the expected 
effect of participants having greater ease describing how they would interact with the graspable 
objects as opposed to the non-graspable objects. The main effect for Prime was not significant, 
F(1, 27) = .99, MSE = 7455.97, p = .33, ηp2 = .035, nor was the Object x Prime interaction, F(1, 
27) = 1.17, MSE = 5135.49, p = .29, ηp2 = .042 (see Figure 3 for median RTs and 95% confidence 
intervals using the Loftus & Masson, 1994 method. Each of the following experiments will also 
use these confidence intervals as error bars).  
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Figure 3. Median semantic generation task RT (ms) for the graspable and non-graspable objects. 
Graspable objects were responded to faster when preceded by the somatosensory prime. No 
significant RT differences were found between the Prime and No-Prime conditions for the non-
graspable objects. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals (±31.1 ms); see Loftus and 
Masson (1994). 
 
Percent error rates were quite low (all less than 3.57% in each condition). There was a 
significant main effect of Object, F(1, 27) = 10.45, MSE = 9.12, p = .003, ηp2 = .28. The main 
effect of Prime, F(1, 27) = .37, MSE = 6.80, p = .55, ηp2 = .013, and the Object x Prime 
interaction were not significant, F(1, 27) = .073, MSE = 12.21, p = .79, ηp2 = .003. The means 
and standard deviations were M = 1.55, SD = 2.79 for the Primed Graspable Object condition, M 
= 3.57, SD = 4.70 for the Primed Non-graspable Object condition, M = 1.42, SD = 2.47 for the 
No-Prime Graspable Object condition, and M = 3.09, SD = 2.71 for the No-Prime Non-graspable 
Object condition (see Figure 4). There was no evidence for any significant speed-accuracy trade 
offs. 
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Figure 4. Percent error for the graspable and non-graspable objects. Results indicate no 
significant speed accuracy trade-offs. Error bars ±0.57. 
 
Planned paired t-tests between the prime and no-prime conditions were then conducted 
for each object type. In support of our hypotheses on median RTs and consistent with the 
confidence intervals in Figure 3 (i.e., if the mean being compared is outside of the other mean’s 
confidence interval, it supports a significant difference), results indicated that graspable objects 
were responded to significantly faster when preceded by the vibratory prime (M = 896.41, SD = 
114.58) than when they were not primed (M = 927.32, SD = 144.24), t(27) = -2.21, p = .036, ηp2 
= .15. Non-graspable objects showed no significant differences between the prime (M = 1051.88, 
SD = 204.72) and no prime (M = 1053.46, SD = 197.87) conditions, t(27) = -.060, p = .95, ηp2 
< .001. When examining ratings for interaction familiarity, the non-graspable objects were found 
to be interacted with significantly less than the graspable objects (M = 4.50, SD = .54 and M = 
2.01, SD = .49, respectively), t(27) = -20.30, p < .001, showing that participants had more motor 
experience with the graspable objects than the non-graspable objects.  
These results were also examined using Bayesian analyses following Rouder, Speckman, 
Sun, Morey & Iverson (2009). This analysis allows for the researcher to examine whether the 
obtained results favour the null or alterative hypothesis, rather than just the alternative hypothesis 
(as with a standard t-test). Using the t ratios from the above t-tests, we obtained a Bayes factor of 
1.29 in favour of a priming effect with the graspable items. Assuming prior odds of one for the 
null and alternative hypotheses, we obtained a posterior probability of .56 in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis, providing only weak evidence of a somatosensory priming effect 
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(according to the strength of evidence ranges proposed by Raftery, 1995, see also Masson, 2011). 
The non-graspable objects resulted in a Bayes factor of 6.84 in favour of the null, and thus a 
posterior probability of 0.13 in favour of an effect. As well, the Bayes factor for the Object x 
Prime interaction (calculated using a t-test of difference scores) was 3.92, resulting in a posterior 
probability of .203 in favour of the alternative hypothesis. 
Discussion 
 The results of this experiment provide preliminary evidence that graspable objects have 
inherent sensorimotor representations that can be influenced by a purely somatosensory prime. 
The somatosensory prime was shown to facilitate the processing of the graspable objects while 
having no impact on the non-graspable objects, which suggests that the processing of these 
objects relies on neural resources in the sensorimotor system, specifically, the somatosensory 
system, either through direct somatosensory involvement, or through its extensive 
interconnectivity with the motor system. However, one limitation of this experiment is the 
relative degree of difficulty between responding how to interact with the graspable and non-
graspable objects. In the absence of a significant interaction between somatosensory stimulation 
and object type, it is difficult to definitively conclude that stimulation selectively improved object 
processing for graspable objects, but not non-graspable objects.  
In support of this interpretation, the non-graspable items showed significantly longer 
reaction times and increased variability in comparison to the non-graspable objects, and 
anecdotally, participants reported greater difficulty in describing the potential interaction with 
these objects. It would appear that the increased reaction times in the non-graspable object 
condition were accompanied by too much variability in this condition to detect a potential 
somatosensory priming effect. Therefore, it may be tempting to argue that the somatosensory 
priming effect may have been due to the alerting quality of the prime rather than facilitation. 
Specifically, it may be possible that the vibratory prime served to facilitate responding to the 
graspable objects in comparison to the blank screen condition, and the lack of power in the non-
graspable condition may have dampened this matching effect. However, we argue that this 
interpretation is unlikely based on the presence of the 6000 Hz tone prior to each trial, which 
should have equally alerted the participant to trial onset regardless of whether the vibratory prime 
was administered. Nevertheless, in the absence of a significant Object x Prime interaction, this 
possibility cannot be ruled out and, therefore, a more powerful experiment was sought. 
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Experiments 2 and 3 address the concern of increased variability in the non-graspable condition 
by using objects that have more easily identifiable action affordances, specifically, objects with 
action affordances for the feet (thus reducing the relative degree of difficulty of responding to the 
different types of objects).  
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Experiment 2 
In this experiment, the graspable objects (objects associated with hand affordances; i.e., 
‘hand’ objects) were the same as those in Experiment 1, however the non-graspable objects were 
replaced with items with action affordances related to the feet (i.e., ‘foot’ objects). These stimuli 
differ from the non-graspable objects from Experiment 1 in that their motor affordances are 
easily identifiable (e.g., ‘kick’ for a soccer ball). Further, if these objects do happen to evoke 
sensorimotor representations, they should be associated more strongly with the foot than with the 
hand (see Esopenko et al., 2012), and therefore the vibratory hand prime should not facilitate 
processing. This experiment will serve to help reduce the variability of responding to the two 
classes of objects, therefore maximizing the potential of finding interaction effects due to 
somatosensory priming for hand object but not foot objects.  
Hypotheses 
Similar to Experiment 1, we hypothesized that the hand objects will show processing 
benefits in the form of faster RTs when preceded by the hand vibratory prime, as these objects 
are thought to have inherent representations in the sensorimotor system. In contrast, the foot 
objects should show no processing benefits as a result of the hand prime. In addition, we expect 
that the two types of stimuli will be differentially influenced by the vibratory prime, resulting in a 
significant Object x Prime interaction.  
Methods 
The methods were the same as for Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. 
Participants. Twenty-eight university students who spoke English as their first language 
(Mage = 20.75, 25 right-handed) participated in this study.  
Stimuli. In this experiment, the non-graspable objects were replaced with ‘foot’ objects 
(e.g., a soccer ball, an ice skate; see Appendix C).  
Procedure. As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to respond how they would 
interact with the target objects as quickly and accurately as possible. For the foot items, 
participants were encouraged to say actions related to the feet, rather than the hands (e.g., ‘kick’ 
for soccer ball instead of ‘throw’) in order to ensure that the foot objects elicited minimal 
sensorimotor involvement from areas associated with the hands. Trials in which the participant 
responded by saying hand related actions were marked as errors and removed prior to analysis.  
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Results 
All errors and spoils were removed prior to analysis (7.4% of the total trials). We 
conducted a 2 (Object [Hand Item, Foot Item]) x 2 (Prime [Hand Prime, No Prime]) general 
linear model ANOVA on median RTs. We found a significant main effect of Object, F(1, 27) = 
22.50, MSE = 5318.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .46, such that hand items were responded to significantly 
faster than foot items (M = 771.49 and M = 836.94, respectively). The main effect for Prime was 
not significant, F(1, 27) = .91, MSE = 2743.31, p > .25, ηp2 = .033. Importantly, there was 
significant Object x Prime interaction, F(1, 27) = 10.22, MSE = 1531.89, p = .004, ηp2 = .28 (see 
Figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 5. Median semantic generation task RT (ms) for the hand and foot objects as a function of 
priming. Hand objects were responded to faster when preceded by the somatosensory prime. 
Error bars ±21.3. 
 
Percent error rates were less than 3.57% in each condition.  We found a significant main 
effect of Object, F(1, 27) = 6.08, MSE = 9.41, p = .020, ηp2 = .18. The main effect for Prime was 
not significant, F(1, 27) = .94, MSE = 6.76, p = .34, ηp2 = .034, nor was there a significant Object 
x Prime interaction, F(1, 27) = .30, MSE = 5.29, p = .59, ηp2 = .011. The means and standard 
deviations were M = 1.90, SD = 2.79 for the Primed Hand Object condition, M = 3.57, SD = 4.70 
for the Primed Foot Object condition, M = 1.67, SD = 2.31 for the No-Prime Hand Object 
condition, and M = 2.86, SD = 3.23 for the No-Prime Foot Object condition (see Figure 6). There 
was no evidence of any significant speed-accuracy trade-offs. 
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Figure 6. Percent error for the hand and foot objects as a function of priming. There is no 
evidence of any significant speed/accuracy trade-offs. Error bars ±1.01. 
 
Planned paired t-tests on median RTs between the prime and no-prime conditions were 
conducted for each object type. Results indicated that hand items were responded to significantly 
faster when preceded by the vibratory prime (M = 754.95, SD = 102.25) than when they were not 
primed (M = 788.04, SD = 106.19), t(27) = -3.62, p = .001, ηp2 = .33. Foot items showed no 
significant differences between the prime (M = 844.04, SD = 136.52) and no prime (M = 829.84, 
SD = 122.44) conditions, t(27) = .95, p > .25, ηp2 = .033.  
Bayesian analysis examining priming effects in the hand items showed a Bayes factor of 
26.13 in favour of an effect. Assuming prior odds of one for the null and alternative hypotheses, 
we obtained a posterior probability of .963 in favour of the alternative hypothesis, providing 
strong evidence of an effect. The priming effects for the foot objects resulted in a Bayes factor of 
4.44 in favour of the null, and thus a posterior probability of 0.184 in favour of an effect. As well, 
the Bayes factor for the Object x Prime interaction was 9.82, resulting in a strong posterior 
probability of .908 in favour of the alternative hypothesis. 
Once again, when examining ratings for interaction familiarity, the foot objects were 
found to be interacted with significantly less than the hand objects (M  = 5.02, SD = .56 and M = 
2.37, SD = .43, respectively), t(27) = -32.59, p < .001, showing a similar pattern to the non-
graspable objects from Experiment 1. In comparing the non-graspable objects from Experiment 1 
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with the foot items in this experiment we found that, as expected, the response times to the foot 
items were significantly faster than the response times to the non-graspable items, F(1, 54) = 
25.62, MSE = 50870.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .32. Further, Levene’s test showed significantly different 
variances between the non-graspable and foot objects, such that the foot objects had less variance 
than the non-graspable objects, F(1, 54) = 6.44, p = .014 in the Prime condition, and F(1, 54) = 
4.99, p = .030 in the No Prime condition.  
Discussion 
 Similar to Experiment 1, results from Experiment 2 show that pre-activating the 
somatosensory system has the ability to aid processing of objects with hand affordances. As the 
hand objects were shown to be processed faster when preceded by the somatosensory prime 
while foot objects showed no processing benefits, our results provide strong support that the 
conceptual representation of how one interacts with these hand objects is held, at least in part, in 
the somatosensory system. Further, as both the hand and foot objects had easily identifiable 
action affordances, but differed based on the site of action affordance, we were able to examine 
the contribution of the somatosensory system to the objects with hand affordances only. 
Importantly, the presence of an interaction between priming and object type illustrates differential 
effects between these two types of stimuli as a function of somatosensory stimulation. This 
indicates that vibratory priming of the hand does not simply serve to better alert one to the 
upcoming target (as discussed as a possible interpretation of the results of Experiment 1) and, 
instead, that it aids retrieval of semantic knowledge about how one interacts with objects. As well, 
based on the significantly different interactability ratings between the hand and the foot objects, 
this experiment also supports research that has found effects of expertise in sensorimotor 
involvement in object processing (e.g., Kiefer et al., 2007; Weisberg et al., 2007). As the hand 
objects were found to be interacted with significantly more than the foot objects and were shown 
to influenced by the somatosensory prime, this provides evidence that the extent to which an 
individual is familiar with interacting with an object influences the extent of its representations in 
the somatosensory system.  
A potential limitation of this study is, however, that it is possible that drawing attention to 
the hand (via the vibration) served to simply evoke the semantic concept of a hand, thus speeding 
responses to objects associated with the hand that was not directly related to activation of the 
somatosensory cortex. Thus, it is possible that the results of this experiment are due to simple 
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matching between the target and the prime, such that a drawing attention the hand (via the hand 
vibration) creates expectations that a hand object will occur. In order to address this question, 
Experiment 3 will examine whether there are similar matching processes found for the foot 
objects, such that drawing attention to the foot (via a foot vibratory prime) serves to enhance 
processing of the foot objects.  
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Experiment 3 
 This experiment seeks to examine the impact of a foot vibratory prime on object 
processing, in order to assess whether vibration from a modality other than the hand has the 
ability to influence object processing. As well, it seeks to examine whether the priming effects 
found in Experiments 1 and 2 may be due to matching processes, such that the vibratory prime 
creates an expectation of which target will appear (i.e., a hand object following a hand prime). To 
test this, the hand vibratory prime will be replaced with a foot vibratory prime, which will allow 
us to examine whether foot objects show a matching effect with the foot prime. 
Hypotheses 
 In this experiment, it is hypothesized that there will be no influence of the foot 
somatosensory prime on object processing and no evidence of matching effects. Specifically, the 
foot objects should not show systematically faster reaction times as a function of the foot prime, 
as these objects should not evoke strong somatosensory representations based on their primarily 
foot affordances. Further, as evidenced in Experiment 2, the foot objects lack the same degree of 
interactive experience as the hand objects, thus further supporting the idea that they should have 
minimal somatosensory representations. As such, for both the foot and hand objects, it is not 
expected that there will be any influence of the foot prime. 
Methods 
The methods and participants were the same as for Experiment 2, with the following 
exceptions. 
Procedure. In this experiment, the hand vibratory prime was replaced with a foot 
vibratory prime. 
Results 
All errors and spoils were removed prior to analysis (7.8% of the total trials). We 
conducted a 2 (Object [Hand Item, Foot Item]) x 2 (Prime [Foot Prime, No Prime]) general linear 
model ANOVA on median RTs. We found a main effect of Object, F(1, 27) = 18.25, MSE = 
10460.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, such that hand items were responded to significantly faster than 
foot items (M = 781.58 and M = 864.16, respectively). The main effect for Prime was not 
significant, F(1, 27) = .19, MSE = 2178.34, p > .25, ηp2 = .063. The Object x Prime interaction 
was also not significant, F(1, 27) = .46, MSE = 5134.00, p = .50, ηp2 = .017 (see Figure 7).  
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Figure 7. Median semantic generation RT (ms) for the hand and foot objects as a function of foot 
priming. No significant RT differences were found between the Prime and No-Prime conditions 
for either the hand or foot objects. Error bars ±28.9 ms. 
 
Percent error rates were less than 3.57% in each condition.  There was a significant main 
effect of Object, F(1, 27) = 11.79, MSE = 6.07, p = .002, ηp2 = .30. The main effect for Prime was 
not significant, F(1, 27) = .10, MSE = 7.66, p = .75, ηp2 = .004, nor was there a significant Object 
x Prime interaction, F(1, 27) = .057, MSE = 5.17, p = .81, ηp2 = .002. The means and standard 
deviations were M = 1.87, SD = 2.78 for the Primed Hand Object condition, M = 3.57, SD = 3.25 
for the Primed Foot Object condition, M = 1.80, SD = 2.84 for the No-Prime Hand Object 
condition, and M = 3.30, SD = 3.70 for the No-Prime Foot Object condition (see Figure 8). There 
was no evidence of any significant speed-accuracy trade-offs. 
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Figure 8. Percent error for the hand and foot objects as a function of foot priming. There is no 
evidence of any significant speed/accuracy trade-offs. Error bars ±0.95. 
 
Planned paired t-tests on median RTs between the prime and no-prime conditions were 
conducted for each object type. Results indicated no significant differences for the hand objects 
in the prime condition (M = 771.02, SD = 106.47) versus the no-prime condition (M = 792.14, SD 
= 142.96), t(27) = -1.61, p = .12, ηp2 = .087. Foot items also showed no significant differences 
between the prime (M = 862.82, SD = 182.24) and no prime (M = 865.50, SD = 137.44) 
conditions, t(27) = -.14, p = .89, ηp2 = .001.  
Bayesian analysis examining priming effects in the hand items showed a Bayes factor of 
2.06 in favour of the null. Assuming prior odds of one for the null and alternative hypotheses, we 
obtained a posterior probability of .327 in favour of the alternative hypothesis. The priming 
effects for the foot objects resulted in a Bayes factor of 6.79 in favour of the null, and thus a 
posterior probability of 0.128 in favour of an effect. As well, the Bayes factor for the Object x 
Prime interaction was 5.48 in favour of the null, resulting in a posterior probability of .15 in 
favour of the alternative hypothesis. 
The ratings for interaction familiarity are shown in Experiment 2, as participants 
performed both the hand vibration and foot vibration conditions in the same session.  
Comparison of Experiments 2 and 3 
Because the hand vibration and foot vibration experiments were performed within 
subjects, we also conducted comparisons between them. This allowed us to examine whether 
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participants were responding similarly to the objects in both of the experiments (i.e., differential 
results are not confounded by inherent differences in RT).  
Impact of experiment on object processing. To examine whether or not responses to the 
objects were similar between Experiment 2 (hand vibration) and Experiment 3 (foot vibration), 
we conducted a 2 (Experiment [Experiment 2, Experiment 3]) x 2 (Prime [Prime, No Prime]) x 2 
(Object [Hand Object, Foot Object]) general linear model ANOVA. Results showed a significant 
main effect of Object, F(1, 27) = 24.70, MSE = 9272.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .48, such that hand items 
were responded to significantly faster than foot items (M = 762.99 and M = 853.43, respectively). 
The main effect for Prime was significant, F(1, 27) = 33.62, MSE = 3620.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. 
The main effect for Experiment was not significant, F(1, 27) = 3.48, MSE = 48048.74, p = .073, 
ηp2 = .11. There was a significant Experiment x Prime interaction, F(1, 27) = 40.88, MSE = 
1892.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .60. The Experiment x Object interaction was not significant, F(1, 27) = 
1.19, MSE = 5416.19, p = .28, ηp2 = .042, nor was the Object x Prime interaction, F(1, 27) = .3.21, 
MSE = 3540.84, p = .084, ηp2 = .11. The Experiment x Prime x Object interaction was also not 
significant, F(1, 27) = 1.71, MSE = 2893.90, p = .20, ηp2 = .059.  
Of particular interest, to investigate whether the type of prime differentially impacted 
processing of the objects, we performed a 2(Experiment [Experiment 2, Experiment 3]) x 
2(Object [Hand Object, Foot Object]) on the primed conditions only. Results showed a 
significant main effect of Object, F(1, 27) = 24.70, MSE = 9272.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .48, such that 
hand items were responded to significantly faster than foot items (M = 762.99 and M = 853.43, 
respectively). The main effect for Experiment was not significant, F(1, 27) = .33, MSE = 
26081.19, p = .57, ηp2 = .012. The Object x Prime interaction was also not significant, F(1, 27) 
= .011, MSE = 4799.86, p = .92, ηp2 = .000, suggesting that regardless of the vibration location, 
both the hand and foot objects were responded to similarly in both experiments and thus that the 
nature of the prime is not responsible for the differential results found between these experiments.	  
Discussion 
 Results from Experiment 3 provide evidence that the results from Experiment 2 did not 
arise as a function of matching effects between the prime and the object type. As participants did 
not show facilitated responses to the foot items when primed with a vibration to the foot, there is 
no evidence that simply drawing attention to the relevant modality serves to aid in object 
processing. This is an important finding, as it suggests that the somatosensory stimulation itself, 
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and not other stimulus properties, is driving the facilitative effect for the hand objects. Further, 
this experiment supports the idea that somatosensory involvement is modality-specific, as 
somatosensory stimulation to the foot did not significantly influence responses to the hand 
objects, and thus the sensorimotor representation of the hand objects appears to be isolated to the 
hand modality. However, based on the obtained p-value of .12, there is a trend towards the foot 
vibration increasing response times to the hand objects, which may reflect some degree of 
interconnectivity between foot somatosensation and hand object processing. Thus, future research 
is necessary to uncover in which instances somatosensory stimulation can enhance object 
processing in order to more fully address whether somatosensory influences are modality specific 
(e.g., somatosensory stimulation to the arm or torso, which are in close proximity 
somatotopically to the hand region of SI). Regardless, these results do not provide support that 
the somatosensory priming effects for the hand objects in Experiments 1 and 2 are a result of 
matching processes between the prime and the object type. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEPTH OF PROCESSING AND THE AUTOMATICITY OF SOMATOSENSORY 
REPRESENTATIONS 
Experiment 4 
 In the experiments reported thus far, participants have been required to rely on the action 
characteristics of objects to tap into their semantic representations. However, based on the 
controversy in the field as to whether shallow processing of objects inherently leads to 
sensorimotor involvement, it is important to also examine how the somatosensory prime may 
influence simple object naming. While research by Tucker and Ellis (1998) and Helbig et al. 
(2006; as discussed in the introduction) provided support for automatic sensorimotor simulation 
when processing pictures of objects, evidence from Bub and Masson (2010), Yu et al. (2014), 
and Cho and Proctor (2011) has contested these results. Therefore, this experiment will utilize a 
naming paradigm in order to examine whether the results found when requiring the participant to 
attend to the action related semantic representation of the object would be similar to those found 
when they are not required to retrieve this information. By making the action information 
irrelevant to the task, it would be expected that the sensorimotor activation evoked from viewing 
the two-dimensional object stimuli would be greatly diminished or, potentially, entirely absent, 
thus dampening the influence of the somatosensory prime. 
Hypotheses 
 In line with the findings of Bub and Masson (2010), Yu et al. (2014), and Cho and Proctor 
(2011), it is hypothesized that there will be no effect of somatosensory stimulation on naming for 
either of the object types. Thus, in contrast to Experiment 2, the somatosensory prime should not 
facilitate processing of the hand objects. 
Methods 
The methods were the same as for Experiment 2, with the following exceptions. 
Participants. Twenty-eight university students who spoke English as their first language 
(Mage = 19.14, 26 right-handed) participated in this study.  
Procedure. Instead of responding how they would interact with the object (Experiments 1, 
2, and 3), participants were asked to simply name the object presented on the screen as quickly 
and accurately as possible.  
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Results 
In concordance with the results reported above, we conducted a 2 (Object [Hand Item, 
Foot Item]) x 2 (Prime [Hand Prime, No Prime]) general linear model ANOVA on median RTs, 
and all errors and spoils were removed prior to analysis (9.6% of the total trials). We found a 
main effect of Object, F(1, 27) = 53.84, MSE = 3442.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .67, such that hand items 
were responded to significantly faster than foot items (M = 605.70 and M = 687.05, respectively). 
The main effect for Prime was not significant, F(1, 27) = 2.19, MSE = 956.95, p = .15, ηp2 = .075. 
The Object x Prime interaction was also not significant, F(1, 27) = .001, MSE = 1367.54, p = .97, 
ηp2 = .000 (see Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 9. Median naming RT (ms) for the hand and foot objects. No significant RT differences 
were found between the Prime and No-Prime conditions for either the hand or foot objects. Error 
bars ±16.5 ms. 
 
Percent error rates were less than 5.83% in each condition. There was a significant main 
effect of Object, F(1, 27) = 34.02, MSE = 19.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. The main effect for Prime 
was not significant, F(1, 27) = .15, MSE = 12.07, p = . 70, ηp2 = .006, nor was there a significant 
Object x Prime interaction, F(1, 27) = .003, MSE = 12.14, p = .96, ηp2 = .000. The means and 
standard deviations were M = .88, SD = 1.81 for the Primed Hand Object condition, M = 5.83, SD 
= 6.38 for the Primed Foot Object condition, M = .65, SD = 1.42 for the No-Prime Hand Object 
condition, and M = 5.54, SD = 5.08 for the No-Prime Foot Object condition (see Figure 10). 
There was no evidence of any significant speed-accuracy trade-offs. 
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Figure 10. Percent error for the hand and foot objects as a function of hand priming. There is no 
evidence of any significant speed/accuracy trade-offs. Error bars ±1.45. 
 
Planned paired t-tests on median RTs between the prime and no-prime conditions were 
conducted for each object type. Results indicated no significant differences for the hand objects 
in the prime condition (M = 601.50, SD = 50.72) versus the no-prime condition (M = 609.89, SD 
= 61.93), t(27) = -1.17, p = .25, ηp2 = .048. Foot items also showed no significant differences 
between the prime (M = 682.61, SD = 94.00) and no prime (M = 691.50, SD = 90.14) conditions, 
t(27) = -.83, p = .41, ηp2 = .025.  
Bayesian analysis examining priming effects in the hand items showed a Bayes factor of 
3.58 in favour of the null. Assuming prior odds of one for the null and alternative hypotheses, we 
obtained a posterior probability of .22 in favour of the alternative hypothesis. The priming effects 
for the foot objects resulted in a Bayes factor of 4.92 in favour of the null, and thus a posterior 
probability of 0.17 in favour of an effect. As well, the Bayes factor for the Object x Prime 
interaction was 6.85 in favour of the null, resulting in a posterior probability of .13 in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis. 
Similarly to Experiments 2 and 3, when examining ratings for interaction familiarity, the 
foot objects were found to be interacted with significantly less than the hand objects (M  = 5.20, 
SD = .51 and M = 2.49, SD = .40, respectively), t(26) = -32.93, p < .001. The data of one 
participant’s ratings was lost due to a program malfunction.  
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Discussion 
 Results from this experiment suggest that simple viewing and naming of two-dimensional 
objects is not sufficient to evoke strong sensorimotor involvement, and thus no somatosensory 
priming effects. This may be due to two possible explanations. First, two-dimensional stimuli 
may not automatically recruit the sensorimotor system and, thus when action features of the 
object are not necessary for the task this system is not involved. Conversely, it may be possible 
that this type of stimulus does still necessitate sensorimotor involvement, however it is to a much 
lesser degree than during the semantic generation task.  
The results from this experiment provide interesting implications for the effect of context 
on the degree to which there is involvement of the sensorimotor system. Further, these results 
suggest that it is possible that inconsistencies in task demands of previous researchers 
experiments may contribute to differential results and, therefore, that researchers should employ a 
variety of tasks that elicit differing levels of processing to tap into the semantic representation of 
objects when attempting to investigate sensorimotor involvement. However, it is also possible 
that the variability in this task (i.e., responses to foot objects were still significantly slower than 
responses to hand objects), though greatly reduced from the above experiments, may still serve to 
diminish the power available to see an effect of the somatosensory prime. Therefore, Experiment 
5 will attempt to remediate this by rendering the object stimuli irrelevant to the task, thus 
eliminating this variability. As well, flipping the task will allow us to examine whether 
significant somatosensory priming effects can be found in the reverse direction, such that hand 
objects prime sensory detection of hand stimulation. This would be an important demonstration 
for illustrating that these objects have somatosensory representations, as it follows logically that 
if they do elicit somatosensory system activation, this should be able to influence somatosensory 
detection.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE IMPACT OF OBJECT PRIMES ON SOMATOSENSORY DETECTION 
Experiment 5 
 This experiment seeks to provide converging evidence for a relationship between 
somatosensory involvement and the processing of hand objects by flipping the task in the earlier 
experiments. Participants were required to detect whether the hand vibration was present or 
absent after being primed by either a hand or foot object. This also serves to eliminate the 
apparent differences between responding to the hand and foot items in order to see if the objects 
have the ability to prime the somatosensory system and therefore aid in detection of the vibratory 
stimulus.  
Hypotheses 
We hypothesized that hand object primes will lead to faster ‘yes’ responses in the 
presence of a hand vibration than ‘no’ responses in the absence of a vibration, whereas foot 
object primes should not speed detection of a vibration. Further, we hypothesize that RTs will be 
fastest in the hand object prime/vibration present condition in comparison to all other conditions, 
particularly the foot object prime/vibration condition, as this would indicate that hand objects are 
affecting somatosensory detection.  
Methods 
 The methods for Experiment 5 were similar to Experiment 2, with the following 
exceptions.  
Participants. Twenty-eight university students who spoke English as their first language 
(Mage = 20.71, 25 right-handed) participated in this study.  
Procedure. In Experiment 2, presentation of either the hand or foot object (the prime) 
preceded the hand vibration (the target). The object prime was presented on the screen for the 
same duration as the vibratory prime in the previous experiments (250 ms) and was followed by 
either a hand vibration or no vibration. The same 6000 Hz tone as in Experiment 1 coincided 
presentation of the object prime. Participants were required to say ‘yes’ if they felt a vibration 
and ‘no’ if they did not feel a vibration as quickly and accurately as possible.  
Results 
 All errors and spoils were removed prior to analysis (12.9% of the total trials). We 
conducted a 2 (Object [Hand Item, Foot Item]) x 2(Vibration [Hand Vibration, No Vibration]) 
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general linear model ANOVA on median RTs. There was a significant main effect of Vibration, 
F(1, 27) = 12.62, MSE = 838.79, p = .001,  ηp2 = .32, whereas the main effect of Object was not 
significant, F(1, 27) = .011, MSE = 680.92, p = .92, ηp2 < .001, suggesting that, unlike 
Experiment 1, there were no inherent differences in difficulty for responding based on the 
different object categories. Importantly, there was a significant Object x Vibration interaction, 
F(1, 27) = 4.46, MSE = 537.26, p = .044, ηp2 = .14 (see Figure 11).  
 
 
Figure 11. Median somatosensory detection RT (ms) of the hand vibration for the hand and foot 
objects. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals (±9.85 ms); see Loftus and Masson (1994). 
 
When examining percent error rates, there was no significant main effect of Object, F(1, 
27) = 1.64, MSE = 37.28, p = .21, ηp2 = .057, nor a main effect for Vibration, F(1, 27) = 3.36, 
MSE = 51.33, p = .078, ηp2 = .11 The Object x Vibration interaction was not significant, F(1, 27) 
= 1.27 MSE = 30.09, p > .25, ηp2 = .045. The means and standard deviations were M = 11.02, SD 
= 5.09 for the Hand Vibration Hand Object condition, M = 13.67, SD = 9.42 for the Hand 
Vibration Foot Object condition, M = 9.71, SD = 7.77 for the No-Vibration Hand Object 
condition, and M = 10.02, SD = 6.56 for the No-Vibration Foot Object condition (see Figure 12). 
Post-hoc t-tests indicated a potential speed-accuracy trade-off in the foot object condition, 
whereby there was a marginally significant difference between the Vibration and No-Vibration 
conditions for these objects. Specifically, participants appeared to be less accurate in the vibration 
condition than the no vibration condition, t(27) = 2.02, p = .053, ηp2 = .13. No significant speed 
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accuracy trade-offs were present for the hand vibration hand object conditions, t(27) = .82, p 
= .42, ηp2 = .024.  
 
 
Figure 12. Percent error for somatosensory detection as a function of object type. There appears 
to be a significant speed-accuracy trade-off for the foot objects. Error bars ±2.37. 
 
Planned paired t-tests on median RT between the hand object prime and foot object prime 
conditions were conducted for each object type. Results indicated that for the hand object primes, 
participants were significantly faster at detecting the presence of the hand vibration (M = 459.82, 
SD = 77.92) than when they were at detecting its absence (M = 488.52, SD = 81.34), t(27) = -3.65, 
p = .001, ηp2 = .33. The foot object primes resulted in no significant differences between 
detecting the presence of the vibration (M = 469.59, SD = 74.65) versus its absence (M = 479.82, 
SD = 76.21), t(27) = -1.69, p = .10, ηp2 = .096, however the 95% confidence intervals do indicate 
that there is a small but significant difference between these two conditions. As well, based on 
the 95% confidence intervals, the detection of a present vibration was significantly slower in the 
foot object condition than the hand object condition (however this did not reach significance 
using a paired t-test, t(27) = -1.61, p = .12, ηp2 = .087). 
Bayesian Analyses. Bayesian analysis examining priming effects in the hand items 
showed a Bayes factor of 28.05 in favour of an effect. Assuming prior odds of one for the null 
and alternative hypotheses, we obtained a posterior probability of .97 in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis, providing strong evidence of an effect. The priming effects for the foot objects 
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resulted in a Bayes factor of 1.83 in favour of the null, and thus a posterior probability of 0.353 in 
favour of an effect. The Bayes factor for the Object x Vibration interaction was 1.09, resulting in 
a posterior probability of .53 in favour of the alternative hypothesis.  
Once again, when examining ratings for interaction familiarity, the foot objects were 
found to be interacted with significantly less than the hand objects (M  = 5.21, SD = .54 and M = 
2.52, SD = .41, respectively), t(27) = -34.25, p < .001, showing a similar pattern to Experiment 2.  
Discussion 
 Results from this experiment show a reciprocal relationship between object processing 
and the somatosensory system. Although the foot objects also showed faster ‘yes’ responses to 
the prime, this effect is most likely due to a well-known phenomena in psychological research 
that participants are generally faster at identifying that a stimulus is present than they are at 
reporting that a stimulus is absent (e.g., in object detection, Biederman, Glass, and Stacy, 1973). 
However, this bias would be apparent for both the hand and the foot objects and, thus the 
presence of the interaction becomes crucial for interpreting the results. As participants were faster 
at detecting the somatosensory prime when it was preceded by a hand object, and the degree of 
this facilitation differed significantly between the object types (as indexed by the significant 
Object x Prime interaction), it appears that the hand objects automatically evoked activation in 
the somatosensory system that subsequently facilitated detection time. Importantly, based on the 
95% confidence intervals, detection of the target when the prime was a hand object was found to 
be significantly faster than when the prime was a foot object, further supporting this 
interpretation. Finally, the foot object results also appear to be compromised by a speed accuracy 
trade-off, thus suggesting that although the participants were significantly faster at detecting the 
hand vibration when it was preceded by a foot object, they made significantly more errors. This 
was not the case with the hand object primes, further supporting our conclusions.  
 It is important to note that in this experiment, the participants were not instructed to 
imagine themselves interacting with the prime object, and thus were not explicitly asked to draw 
upon semantic action knowledge of that object. This is an interesting finding, as it suggests that 
the hand objects automatically evoked sensorimotor programs in the absence of explicit 
instructions to do so. This is interesting in comparison to the results of Experiment 4, which 
found no effect of the somatosensory prime on object naming. However, we propose two possible 
explanations to this apparent difference. First, it may be the case that the visual information is 
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more salient than the somatosensory information, and therefore the participants are more able to 
ignore the somatosensory prime (Experiment 4) compared to the visual prime. This is in 
concordance with research by Buelte et al. (2008) who found applying repetitive TMS to 
virtually lesion the anterior IPS selectively impaired trials where the participants engaged in 
visual encoding of an object followed by a tactile recognition task, but not when they engaged in 
tactile encoding of an object followed by a visual recognition task. Thus, it follows that visual 
information may be more salient than haptic information, therefore leading to less influence of 
the somatosensory cue when it precedes object processing and more influence of the object prime 
when it precedes somatosensory detection. Alternatively, it may be the case that the context of 
the task in this experiment made it favourable for the sensorimotor representations of the objects 
to the drawn upon. Specifically, it is possible that in the context of a detection task, participants 
placed more weight on the object cue in order to perform the task as quickly as possible. This 
may help to explain the trend for a speed/accuracy trade-off seen in the foot object condition, as 
participants were more likely to say ‘no’ in the presence of a hand prime (i.e., greater percent 
error) when the foot object prime was presented than any other condition, suggesting that the foot 
object may have biased the participant to report that the hand prime was not detected. Regardless, 
this experiment provides further evidence for an intrinsic relationship between processing 
manipulable objects and the somatosensory system, as well as extending the aforementioned 
results to accommodate some level of automaticity of the sensorimotor representations evoked by 
viewing the object pictures.   
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Experiment 6 
This Experiment will use a foot vibration target in place of the hand vibration target used 
in Experiment 5, in order to examine whether the nature of the object prime has the ability to aid 
sensory detection of the vibratory stimulus to the foot. Thus, this experiment is analogous to 
Experiment 3, which sought to examine whether the facilitatory effects in response to the hand 
prime were due primarily to matching processes, except with a similar procedure to Experiment 5.  
Hypotheses 
 We hypothesize that, because the benefits of somatosensory priming were exclusive to the 
hand vibration in Experiments 1 and 2, there should be no impact of object type on detection of 
the foot somatosensory prime. Therefore, we expect to find no evidence of matching effects in 
this experiment, and therefore that the object type should not differentially speed detection of the 
foot somatosensory prime. 
Methods 
The methods and participants were the same as for Experiment 5, with the following 
exceptions. 
Procedure. In this experiment, the hand vibratory prime was replaced with a foot 
vibratory prime (similar to Experiment 3).  
Results 
 All errors and spoils were removed prior to analysis (13.9% of the total trials). We 
conducted a 2 (Object [Hand Item, Foot Item]) x 2 (Vibration [Foot Vibration, No Vibration]) 
general linear model ANOVA on median RTs. There was a significant main effect of Vibration, 
F(1, 27) = 12.29, MSE = 1555.71, p = .002,  ηp2 = .31, such that participants were faster at 
responding ‘yes’ in the presence of the vibration than responding ‘no’ in the absence of the 
vibration (M = 461.56 and M = 487.70, respectively). Similarly to Experiment 5, the main effect 
of Object was not significant, F(1, 27) = .23, MSE = 714.39, p = .64, ηp2 = .008. Importantly 
however, unlike Experiment 5, there was no significant Object x Vibration interaction, F(1, 27) 
= .62, MSE = 655.71, p = .44, ηp2 = .022 (see Figure 13). This indicates that the object category is 
not differentially influencing vibration detection.  
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Figure 13. Median somatosensory detection RT (ms) of the foot vibration for the hand and foot 
objects. Error bars ±13 ms. 
 
When examining percent error rates, there was a significant main effect of Vibration, F(1, 
27) = 6.74, MSE = 96.80, p = .015, ηp2 = .20. The main effect for Object was not significant, F(1, 
27) = 1.72, MSE = 26.32, p = .20, ηp2 = .060. The Object x Vibration interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 27) = .53, MSE = 52.26, p =.47, ηp2 = .019. The means and standard deviations 
were M = 12.24, SD = 10.00 for the Foot Vibration Hand Object condition, M = 12.51, SD = 
10.43 for the Foot Vibration Foot Object condition, M = 6.42, SD = 5.67 for the No-Vibration 
Hand Object condition, and M = 8.69, SD = 8.05 for the No-Vibration Foot Object condition (see 
Figure 14). Based on these results, it appears that there may be a significant speed accuracy trade-
off, such that the faster ‘yes’ detection responses are compromised by increased errors. 
  
420	  440	  
460	  480	  
500	  520	  
540	  
Hand	  Object	   Foot	  Object	  
M
ed
ia
n	  
RT
	  (m
s)
	  
Object	  Type	  
Foot	  Vibration	  No	  Vibration	  
 47 
 
Figure 14. Percent error for somatosensory detection as a function of object type. There appears 
to significant speed accuracy trade offs in vibration detection for both object types. Error bars 
±2.89. 
 
Planned paired t-tests between the vibration and no-vibration conditions were conducted 
for each object type. Results indicated that hand object primes led to significantly faster detection 
of the vibratory prime (M = 464.68, SD = 75.61) than reporting the vibration’s absence (M = 
487.00, SD = 62.90), t(27) = -2.63, p = .014, ηp2 = .20. Foot object primes also showed significant 
differences between detecting the presence of the vibration (M = 458.45, SD = 72.31) versus 
detecting its absence (M = 488.39, SD = 72.14), t(27) = -3.24, p = .003, ηp2 = .28.  
Bayesian Analyses. Bayesian analysis examining priming effects in the hand items 
showed a Bayes factor of 2.89 in favour of an effect. Assuming prior odds of one for the null and 
alternative hypotheses, we obtained a posterior probability of .743 in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis. The priming effect for the foot objects resulted in a Bayes factor of 10.71 in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis, and thus a posterior probability of 0.915 in favour of an effect. The 
Bayes factor for the Object x Vibration interaction was 5.08 in favour of the null, resulting in a 
posterior probability of .164 in favour of the alternative hypothesis. Ratings for interaction 
familiarity were the same as Experiment 5.  
Discussion 
 The results from this experiment serve to provide a more comprehensive picture of the 
impact of object processing on somatosensory detection. Based on the results of Experiments 1 
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and 2, we expected that the relationship between object processing and the somatosensory system 
was exclusive to hand objects and hand vibration, which is supported by the findings of this 
experiment. As the priming effects from the hand object primes were not shown to vary from the 
priming effects from the foot object primes, we have found no evidence to suggest that the nature 
of the object prime led to differentially faster foot vibration detection. Further, these results 
provide evidence that the pattern found in Experiment 5 is (similarly to Experiment 2) not due to 
matching processes between the object prime and the vibration target, as both the hand and foot 
objects showed a similar pattern of results. Overall, participants were significantly faster at 
detecting the prime when it was present as opposed to stating it was absent (congruent with the 
results of Experiment 5). However, this did not vary differentially based on the nature of the 
object prime (as indicated by the lack of a significant Object x Prime interaction) and thus the 
object prime did not influence somatosensory processing. As well, there was a significant speed-
accuracy trade-off for target detection regardless of the object type, whereby although 
participants were faster at indicating that they detected the vibration, they were also less accurate. 
Overall, these results support our interpretation of the findings from Experiment 5 being due to 
an intrinsic relationship between the somatosensory system and hand object processing, rather 
than simple matching processes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This series of experiments provides support for the idea that the conceptual 
representations of objects are in part encompassed in the somatosensory system, thus supporting 
theories of embodied cognition. Taken together, results from Experiments 1 and 2 provide direct 
evidence that at least part of the semantic representation of graspable objects involves the 
somatosensory system. As processing benefits were found for hand objects when the 
somatosensory system was primed, we have shown that these two processes share at least some 
underlying neural resources in the sensorimotor system. In contrast, the non-graspable 
(Experiment 1) and foot objects (Experiment 2) did not show processing benefits as a result of 
the prime, suggesting that the representation of these objects is not held within the sensorimotor 
areas associated with the hand. Importantly, based on the presence of the 6000 Hz tone at the 
onset of each of the trials, our results cannot be attributed to alerting effects, such that faster RTs 
in the vibration condition can be attributed to decreased temporal uncertainty (Callejas et al., 
2005), which would lead to larger cuing effects in the faster hand object condition than the 
slower foot object condition. 
Further, Experiment 3 provides evidence that these priming effects cannot be attributed to 
semantic matching, such that drawing attention to the hand aids processing of hand related 
objects, as this effect did not arise with the foot objects when using a foot prime. This suggests 
that the effects from Experiments 1 and 2 were due to the somatosensory nature of the prime, and 
not simply the prime itself. This experiment also suggests that general somatosensory activation 
(in this case, via the foot prime) is not sufficient to influence object processing, as the hand 
objects showed no processing benefits in the presence of the foot prime, and thus that conceptual 
representations have domain specific sensorimotor activation. Further, based on the ratings of 
interaction familiarity, it appears that prior experience with an object influences whether or not 
the conceptual representation of the object will be held in the sensorimotor system (in 
concordance with Kiefer et al., 2007; Weisberg et al., 2007; James et al., 2002), as the foot 
objects were shown to be interacted with significantly less than the hand objects. Thus, results 
from Experiments 1 to 3 support the conclusion that the somatosensory system has the ability to 
influence object processing in a way that is dependent upon prior action experience with the 
object. 
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The evidence provided from Experiment 4 has important implications for evaluating the 
sensorimotor involvement automatically evoked upon presentation of picture of an object. If 
simply viewing an object relies on the same neural mechanisms as those employed when 
performing the semantic generation task in Experiments 1 and 2, we would have expected to see 
a similar pattern of results in naming. This was not the case, however, as the somatosensory 
prime was not shown to impact object processing when participants were not required to access 
the action characteristics of the object. Thus, this experiment provides evidence that the semantic 
representation of objects can be accessed in more than one way, with different forms of access 
leading to differential involvement of the sensorimotor system (see also Borowsky & Masson, 
1996 for an additional example where naming was not as effective at eliciting semantic effects 
compared to other tasks). It is important to note that although no effects of the somatosensory 
prime were found in this experiment, this does not necessarily indicate that there is no automatic 
sensorimotor activation. Indeed, the results from Experiment 5 provide evidence that there is 
some degree of automatic somatosensory involvement during object processing, as mere 
presentation of the hand object primes led to differentially faster detection of the somatosensory 
stimulus. In addition, the findings from this experiment further corroborate the findings from 
Experiments 1 and 2, providing converging evidence of a reciprocal relationship between the 
somatosensory system and the representation of manipulable objects. Finally, Experiment 6 
examined how object processing influenced foot vibration detection, finding that somatosensory 
detection did not vary differentially as a function of the type of object prime. This provides 
further support that the reciprocal relationship between somatosensory and object processing is 
constrained to hand items and hand vibration. As well, the results from Experiment 6 showed that 
the results found in Experiment 5 were once again not due to matching effects between the prime 
and the target and, instead, that the manipulable nature of the object prime influenced 
somatosensory detection. Overall, this series of experiments serves to provide insight into the 
complex relationship between object processing and the somatosensory system. Implications of 
these findings for theories of embodied cognition will now be discussed.  
Implications for Embodied Cognition  
To begin, these results support theories of embodied cognition that posit that some, but 
not all, of the conceptual representation of objects are held in the sensorimotor systems 
associated with obtaining semantic knowledge of that object. This is in concordance with the 
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theories of Barsalou (2008) and Gallese and Lakoff (2005), which assert that semantic 
representations arise as partial simulations of the perceptual and motor information used in 
encoding. In addition, these results are in support of studies that have found a functional role of 
the sensorimotor system in object processing (e.g., Witt et al., 2010; Yee et al., 2013), as well as 
studies that have found differential sensorimotor involvement as a function of motor experience 
(e.g., Kiefer et al., 2007; Weisberg et al., 2007). Similarly to Witt et al. (2010), activation of the 
sensorimotor system (in this case, the somatosensory system) had the ability to influence object 
processing. While their study showed interference between naming manipulable objects while 
engaging in a motor task (indicating that processing the object required some of the same neural 
resources as performing the motor task), our results show that priming the somatosensory system 
facilitates processing. This is similar to the results obtained by Yee et al. (2013), who showed 
that haptic exploration of an object had the ability to facilitate the identification of degraded 
pictures of objects.  
It is important to note that based on the nature of our task (which sought to maximize 
personally-relevant sensorimotor involvement) we are not arguing that viewing of pictures of 
objects inherently leads to strong sensorimotor system involvement (congruent with the findings 
of Bub & Masson, 2010 and Yu et al., 2014, who failed to replicate the results of Tucker & Ellis, 
1998 and of Cant et al., 2005, who failed to replicate the findings of Craighero et al., 1996; see 
also Mahon & Caramazza, 2008, who purport that sensorimotor involvement is an automatic by-
product of perception). Instead, we suggest that contextual and top-down processing cues can 
influence the degree of motor and sensory involvement (a conclusion that is supported by 
research examining embodiment of words; see Tomasino & Rumiati, 2013 for a review) and, 
therefore, that by having participants rely on their own subjective experience with a given object, 
maximal recruitment of sensorimotor areas would be an effective, top-down processing strategy. 
However, results from Experiment 5 provide evidence of at least some level of automatic 
somatosensory system involvement, as the hand objects were able to prime the somatosensory 
system in the absence of specific instructions to process the object. This has important 
implications for research investigating embodied cognition, as it suggests that some tasks are not 
optimal for examining the extent of sensorimotor system involvement. If the representation of an 
object can be accessed in a variety of ways, it becomes pertinent to understand the conditions by 
which embodiment can be most effectively assessed. Therefore, our research shows that semantic 
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generation is a valuable task that may be more sensitive to examining embodiment effects than 
standard naming paradigms, opening a new avenue of exploration to potentially subtle 
sensorimotor effects.  
In line with this, our research also provides evidence that embodiment effects arise 
primarily as a result of mental simulation. As the semantic generation task used in Experiments 1 
to 3 encouraged participants to draw upon their own action knowledge of how to interact with an 
object, we have optimized the likelihood that mental simulation will take place when processing 
the picture of an object. Thus, it can be inferred that because only the hand objects were 
influenced by the somatosensory prime, embodiment effects arise as a function of engaging in 
mental imagery with familiar objects. Further, the semantic generation task also maximized the 
probability that the participant would engage in kinesthetic mental imagery, whereby individuals 
imagine themselves performing the action from a first person perspective. This is important, as 
Stinear, Byblow, Steyvens, Levin, and Swinnen (2006) found that only this type of motor 
imagery modulated corticomotor excitability. As well, Ruby and Decety (2003) found that only 
kinesthetic motor imagery led to activation in the left IPL and the left SI (important areas in the 
human mirror neuron system). This provides further evidence that the task demands in these 
experiments were optimal for maximizing the amount of sensorimotor involvement elicited, thus 
allowing us to examine the extent to which action simulation and the somatosensory system 
interact. 
Perhaps most importantly, our research draws attention to the relatively neglected 
contribution of touch to embodied cognition, which has been overshadowed by examinations of 
motor influences on object processing. Thus, this research begins to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of the nature of sensorimotor involvement in conceptual representation by 
elucidating the role of the somatosensory system during object processing in isolation of overt 
movements, such that objects that we have experience with are represented more strongly not 
only in the motor system (e.g., Kiefer et al., 2007), but also in the somatosensory system. As 
previous research has proposed convergence of information from all modalities to form 
conceptual representations (see Patterson, Nestor, and Rogers, 2007 for a review), our research 
provides bi-directional evidence for this claim in regards to the convergence of somatosensory 
information and object representation. This is in concordance with the research of Connell and 
Lynott (2010) and Ackerman et al. (2010) who have also shed valuable light on how sensory 
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contributions influence conceptual processing (in the domains of word processing and social 
judgments and decision making, respectively). Thus, in a broader context, our research supports 
theories that propose integrated and distributed representation of concepts throughout the mind, 
such that concepts consist of unified information from different modalities (see Patterson et al., 
2007; in this case, the somatosensory system).  
Implications for the Human Mirror Neuron System 
 This research also has important implications for extending our understanding of the 
human mirror neuron system. It is clear that the human mirror neuron system is undoubtedly 
more complex than the primate mirror neuron system, and while our understanding of this system 
in primates is quite comprehensive, there is still much to be learned about the nature of the mirror 
neuron system in humans. Neuroimaging research has thus far provided compelling evidence that, 
similarly to the monkey mirror system, the human motor system has mirror properties, as 
evidenced by the work of Cross et al. (2013) who, as discussed in the introduction, showed using 
fMRI prefrontal and inferior frontal activation in an imitation control paradigm. Similarly, Sartori 
et al. (2013) showed that the primary motor cortex also has mirror properties, as invoking 
reversible lesions to this area had the ability to modulate activity of the corticospinal tract in 
response to action observation. Further, this has been extended to the somatosensory system, as 
evidenced by the research of Avikainen et al. (2002), Hernandez et al. (2014), and Bisio et al. 
(2015), who all showed that the somatosensory system is involved in processing action 
information. Therefore, it may be interesting to examine whether there are a subset of mirror 
neurons that are activated both to somatosensation as well as motor observation, which would 
provide evidence of somatosensory mirroring. While the above research begins to shed light on 
how actions are represented in sensorimotor regions, as well as highlights the similarities 
between primate and human mirror systems, it does not address how conceptual representation 
may manifest itself in the mirror neuron system.  
Ideally, examination of the mirror neuron system in humans would be investigated using 
electrophysiological recording (similar to primate models), however this currently cannot be 
performed in normal populations. Some recent studies have used clinical populations undergoing 
surgery to examine the mirror neuron system, specifically individuals undergoing surgery for 
intractable epilepsy. For example, Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, and Fried (2010) used 
single neuron recording of the medial temporal and medial frontal cortex and found neurons that 
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were sensitive to both motor execution and observation. Similarly, Babiloni et al. (2016) used 
electrocorticography (in which an electrode grid is placed directly upon the cortex during brain 
surgery) to record brain activity of the primary somatosensory, primary motor, prefrontal, and 
premotor cortex of drug-resistant epileptic patients while the patients either executed or observed 
a movement. Their results found support for the existence of a human mirror neuron system, and 
that different regions contribute differentially during motor execution and observation, in order to 
allow for dissociation of ‘self’ versus ‘other’ actions. Because of the limited ability to perform 
electrophysiological recording of mirror neurons in humans, behavioural and neuroimaging 
studies provide invaluable information about the nature of action understanding and conceptual 
representation. This is especially important in regards to understanding how objects are 
represented in the mirror neuron system, as primates do not have the same understanding of the 
causal influence of an object for achieving a specific goal. Indeed, while primates appear to have 
the preliminary neural structures to integrate objects into the mirror neuron system (i.e., canonical 
and canonical-mirror neurons), the representation of objects in the primate mirror neuron system 
is highly dependent upon experience with the object and quite transient. Further, this does not 
extend to objects presented in extrapersonal space (Bonini et al., 2014), and presumably pictures 
of objects.  
In light of this, the research presented in this thesis begins to shed light on the issue of 
whether pictures of objects are represented in the mirror neuron system- a phenomenon that, as of 
yet, has not been investigated using electrocorticography. Based on the results of Experiments 1, 
2, and 5, we have shown that pictures of objects appear to initiate at least some level of action 
simulation, as evidenced by the somatosensory priming effects in Experiments 1 and 2, and more 
compellingly by the object priming effects in Experiment 5. Without direct instructions to do so, 
it appears that viewing the object picture automatically activated the somatosensory system in 
such a way that facilitated detection of the vibratory stimulus. As the somatosensory system has 
been shown to be a part of the mirror neuron system in humans (both independently and through 
its extensive connectivity with the motor cortex; Avikainen et al., 2002; Hernandez et al., 2014; 
Bisio et al., 2015), these priming effects suggest that presentation of picture of objects that have 
familiar action affordances can evoke mirror neuron system involvement. Thus, this research may 
serve to highlight some of the differences in complexity between the primate and human mirror 
system. Specifically, while both primates and humans have been shown to have canonical and 
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canonical mirror neurons that are active in response to three-dimensional objects presented in 
peripersonal space (e.g., Murata et al., 1997 and Grèzes et al., 2003, respectively), humans may 
also have a similar subtype of neurons that respond to the presentation of two-dimensional 
pictures of objects. Further, it is possible that this may be the mechanism by which the conceptual 
representation of objects becomes embodied, however future research is needed to explore this 
possibility.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
A particularly interesting avenue for exploration would be to have participants perform 
the same tasks using novel objects in a training paradigm. Similar to Kiefer et al. (2007), 
participants could be required to learn how to interact with novel, manipulable objects over a 
training period, whereby half of the participants had active motor experience interacting with it, 
while the other half have an equivalent amount of experience observing another individual 
interacting with it (this manipulation could also be performed within subjects, similar to our 
experiments). This would help to alleviate one of the limitations found in Experiments 1 to 4 
such that there was significantly less variability in responses to the hand objects than to the non-
graspable (Experiment 1) and foot objects (Experiments 2 to 4). This point is exemplified by a 
comparison of the results of Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, whereby the overall means show a 
similar pattern of results, however the critical interaction is not significant in Experiment 1. By 
reducing the variability in responding by introducing the foot objects, our task became much 
more sensitive to observing somatosensory priming interaction effects. While the substitution of 
the foot objects for the non-graspable objects significantly reduced response variability, there 
were still variability differences found between the foot and the hand items, most likely due to 
the participants’ decreased familiarity with these objects. Thus, a training paradigm would serve 
to equate how familiar an individual is with how to interact with a specific object (either through 
observation or overt action), whereby the only difference between the groups would be action 
experience with the object. We predict that somatosensory priming effects would be much larger 
for the objects that participants had overt motor experience with in comparison to the objects that 
they did not interact with. By implementing a training paradigm, this task may become more 
sensitive to somatosensory priming effects, perhaps making it more sensitive in the naming 
condition to picking up somatosensory priming effects.  
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As well, in order to further test the conclusions drawn from this research, neuroimaging 
using these tasks is imperative. Currently, we are adapting these tasks for the fMRI environment 
in order to determine the locus of somatosensory priming effects on object processing. We 
predict that these two processes may overlap in the posterior parietal cortex, specifically the AIP 
and the anterior SMG, as these areas have been shown to be essential in tool processing (Orban & 
Caruana, 2014; Culham et al., 2004) and are in close proximity to the somatosensory cortex 
associated with the hand (see Figure 1). However, as stated above, these processes occur in a 
network of related brain regions, and thus electrocorticography may provide the most temporally 
and anatomically accurate picture of how and where these two processes may be interacting. 
Further, TMS may also provide valuable insight into these processes, as it allows for the 
possibility of selectively stimulating or inhibiting the hand somatosensory cortex. We would 
predict based on our results that when the somatosensory cortex is stimulated, hand object 
processing in the semantic generation task should be facilitated. Conversely, when the 
somatosensory cortex is inhibited, impairments in semantic generation would occur. This 
paradigm would be nearly analogous with the research presented in this thesis (with the 
somatosensory prime being replaced with the TMS pulse), and thus would provide important 
converging evidence for the presented effects. Thus, examining the neural mechanisms that 
underlie the results found in these experiments will provide valuable information into the nature 
of embodiment, as well as examining the possibility that the mirror neuron system is the 
mechanism for embodiment. 
Another interesting future direction would be to study the implications of somatosensory 
stimulation for conceptual development and learning. The findings of Witt et al. (2010), who 
found interference between motor execution and conceptual processing of objects with congruent 
motor affordances, would suggest that motor system activation has the ability to impair 
conceptual processing, and thus interfere with conceptual development. However, throughout our 
experiments (as well as through evidence from Yee et al., 2013) it appears that somatosensory 
stimulation facilitates, rather than interferes with, conceptual processing. Therefore, it may be 
possible to integrate somatosensory stimulation during the acquisition of new concepts, in order 
to strengthen their subsequent representations. This would have important implications for 
learning, as it would provide a simple and cost effective way of integrating multisensory 
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information during the learning process, leading to more efficient semantic knowledge 
acquisition. 
In line with this, another prospective application for this research is the potential for 
alleviating some of the perceptual deficits shown in those with autism. Dysfunction of the mirror 
neuron system has been proposed to play a critical role in the core behavioural deficits of autism 
spectrum disorder (see Oberman & Ramachandran, 2015). Although the majority of the research 
on perceptual deficits in autism has focused on face processing (see Golarai, Grill-Spector, & 
Reiss, 2008 for a review), previous research has also shown that these individuals have additional 
deficits in general object processing. For example, Blair, Frith, Smith, Abell, and Cipolotti (2002) 
found evidence for selective recognition memory impairments for objects that are capable of self-
propelled motion (such as motorbikes and cats) relative to age-matched controls. Further, 
Behrmann et al. (2006) showed that individuals with autism were slower at discriminating 
between objects than controls (see also Behrmann, Thomas, & Humphreys, 2006 for a review). 
While more research is still necessary to determine the types of object stimuli that show the most 
impaired processing (as the object stimuli used in the aforementioned studies was quite limited), 
the possibility of strengthening conceptual representations using somatosensory stimulation 
during a training paradigm may serve to diminish some of these object-specific deficits.   
Further, it may be possible to couple somatosensory stimulation with semantic generation 
of motor imagery in order to strengthen not only conceptual representation, but also aid in skill 
development and, potentially, rehabilitation. Somatosensory input from the environment is 
essential for motor learning and accurate motor task performance, based on the feedback that it 
provides to the motor system (Gentilucci, Toni, Daprati, & Gangitano, 1997; Rosenkranz & 
Rothwell, 2012; Pavlides, Miyashita, & Asanuma, 1993). Thus, it has been shown that reduced 
somatosensory function leads to decreased motor function (Rothwell et al., 1982), as well as 
disrupts recovery of movement after a stroke as occurred (Nudo, Friel, & Delia, 2000). In line 
with this, Ekstrand et al. (2016) provided evidence that integrating somatosensory stimulation 
into pre-surgical planning can improve surgical outcomes by helping to avoid disrupting 
somatosensory function. Interestingly, Rosenkranz and Rothwell (2012) showed that when 
participants performed a vibrotactile detection task (during which the participant was required to 
report when they detected a change in vibration frequency or the presence of a cutaneous 
stimulus), the somatosensory priming from this task increased plasticity of MC when they 
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engaged in subsequent motor execution. Thus, there is an intrinsic relationship between the 
somatosensory and motor systems such that the somatosensory system has the ability to influence 
the functioning and plasticity of the motor system. 
In concordance with this, and similar to the semantic generation task used in these 
experiments, engaging in motor imagery has been shown to be a valuable tool in developing 
motor skills independent of actual motor execution. For example, Zijdewind, Toering, Bessem, 
Van Der Laan, and Diercks (2003) found that seven weeks of motor imagery training (whereby 
the participant imagined themselves repeatedly pointing their toe) had the ability increase the 
force exerted by the ankle muscles involved in performing this action in comparison to groups 
that did not engage in motor imagery. Similarly, research with clinical populations, such as 
individuals with stroke, spinal cord injury, and Parkinson’s disease, has shown that engaging in 
motor imagery has the ability to aid in motor rehabilitation (see Stoykov & Madhavan, 2015 for a 
review). Further, research by Veldman et al. (2015) showed that modality specific somatosensory 
electrical stimulation has the ability to increase motor performance in normal populations of both 
the contralateral and ipsilateral limb in the presence of actual motor execution, as well as 
independently. Thus, our research has important implications for providing an effective and cost 
efficient paradigm for motor skill development in both normal and clinical populations through a 
combination of general somatosensory stimulation (via the vibratory stimulus) and semantic 
generation. This may be especially useful for patients with limited limb mobility who show 
impaired ability to engage in overt motor movements, as it may provide an alternative means of 
strengthening connectivity between the somatosensory and motor systems, in order to maximize 
motor recovery.  
Our results may also have particularly interesting implications for examining individuals 
with object apraxia (i.e., individuals with impairments in their knowledge of how to interact with 
particular objects; see Stamenova, Roy, & Black, 2010). The existence of object apraxia has been 
presented as evidence that concepts are distributed across the sensory and motor domains, as this 
disorder results in a selective deficit in understanding the action semantics of objects. Of 
particular relevance, previous research has indicated that individuals with apraxia show 
impairments in drawing upon manipulation-based action information about objects (Lee, Mirman, 
& Buxbaum, 2014). When participants were asked to name an object in a visual display, apraxics 
showed abnormalities in the automatic activation of action information related to an object (in the 
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form of delayed responses). Based on this, in our task it would be expected that individuals with 
apraxia would most likely show significant impairments in the semantic generation task in 
comparison to control participants, as retrieval of this action information would presumably be 
impaired. What is less clear however, is how the somatosensory prime may influence object 
processing in individuals with apraxia. As described above, the somatosensory system does not 
appear to interact with object processing in the same way that the motor system does, and thus it 
is possible that somatosensory stimulation may facilitate semantic generation performance of 
individuals with apraxia in a similar manner to which it facilitates performance in the participants 
in our study. This would suggest that while action representations of objects may be impaired in 
apraxia, somatosensory representations are not. Although this is currently speculative, research 
focused on how the somatosensory system is involved in conceptual processing in individuals 
with object apraxia will help to shed valuable light on the nature of semantic knowledge in both 
clinical and normal populations.    
Conclusions 
To summarize, the importance of the present research is threefold. First, it extends 
theories of embodied cognition to accommodate somatosensory influences, such that the 
conceptual representations of objects that we interact with become integrated into not only the 
motor system, but also the somatosensory system. In line with this, we propose that the 
somatosensory priming effects shown in these experiments provide evidence of mirroring 
processes for pictures, suggesting that the mechanism by which concepts become embodied is 
based in the mirror system, thus providing a link between the mirror neuron system and the 
embodiment of conceptual representations. Second, in light of this, it expands our understanding 
of the human mirror system by providing evidence that picture processing (particularly semantic 
level processing) may also evoke mirror system involvement, as the somatosensory system has 
been shown to play an integral role in the mirror system (e.g., Avikainen et al., 2002) and object 
processing and somatosensory stimulation were shown here to interact. Third, and more broadly, 
this research elucidates the importance of research examining how touch and somatosensation 
contribute to cognition, which may have important applications for developing learning 
paradigms as well as exploring how somatosensation may be integrated with semantic generation 
tasks to aid in motor skill development and rehabilitation.  
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In conclusion, our results provide corroborative evidence that hand objects have 
sensorimotor representations that differ as a function of action experience, supporting theories of 
semantic representation that highlight convergence of modality-specific information, as well as 
theories purporting sensorimotor involvement in conceptual representations. Further, we also 
provide the first demonstration of a purely somatosensory influence on semantic processing of 
graspable objects, as well as the reciprocal relationship of object processing impacting 
somatosensory detection. It is important to note that while this evidence suggests that the 
somatosensory system is a part of object representation, that is not to say that the somatosensory 
system houses the only representation of that concept. In fact, our results further serve to 
highlight the complexities of object representation in the semantic system. By showing that the 
somatosensory system influences sensorimotor involvement in object processing and vice versa, 
we have provided a richer understanding of how objects are represented within our semantic 
system in such a way that accommodates somatosensory influences. We hope that this research 
will serve as the impetus for future experiments that continue to explore the characteristics and 
limits of somatosensory priming, as well as the contributions of other sensory modalities to 
object representation, in order to broaden our understanding of the mechanisms that underlie 
conceptual processing.  
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Appendix B 
Non-Graspable Objects 
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